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NULLIFICATORY JURIES
KAIMIPONO DAVID WENGER* & DAVID A. HOFFMAN**
INTRODUCTION*
As society becomes increasingly intolerant of the legal system's
imperfections, one frequent target of critiques is the jury's ability to
award punitive damages. Horror stories about excessive punitive
damages circulate on the Internet, radio, and television,' while juries
that award punitive damages are criticized as "out of control," 2 running
"wild" 3 and "amok." 4  One commentator goes so far as to argue that
such awards are like a "giant underground fungus" that "devour[s] a
segment of our society and culture from the inside-out."5  Judges are
similarly worried; in TXO Productions Corporation v. Alliances
Resources Corporation, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote that "the
frequency and size of such [punitive] awards have been skyrocketing."6
Legal academics have bolstered the theoretical and anecdotal case
against punitive damages by enlisting empirical evidence in their attacks
* Associate, Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP. B.A., Arizona State
University, 1998; J.D., Columbia, 2001. Thanks to my wife Mardell Wenger for her
continuous support, and to Sullivan, Kace, and Indigo Wenger for their cheerful and
contagious enthusiasm.
** Associate, Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP. B.A., Yale, 1998; J.D.,
Harvard, 2001. Thanks to my family for their support.
*** We are indebted to many individuals who provided helpful counsel and
editing advice. In particular Professor Daniel M. Filler, the Honorable Jack B.
Weinstein, and Bernard A. Williams, Esq. This Article expresses the views of the
authors, which may differ from those of their current employer, former employers, or
anyone who commented on it. All errors are ours.
1. See Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the
Civil Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 740 (1998). Examples of widely discussed
cases of punitive awards include the McDonald's coffee case, the $185 billion cigarette
award, and the allegations of surgeons put out of business by healthcare costs spiraling
out of control. See, e.g., id. at 727-40; cf. Brad Snyder, Protecting the Media from
Excessive Damages: The Nineteenth-Century Origins of Remittitur and Its Modern
Application in Food Lion, 24 VT. L. REV. 299, 317-19 (2000) (discussing analogous
historical criticisms).
2. W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against
Corporations in Environmental and Safety Torts, 87 GEo. L.J. 285, 333 (1998).
3. Victor E. Schwartz et al., Reining in Punitive Damages "Run Wild":
Proposals for Reform by Courts and Legislatures, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1003, 1003
(1999).
4. Richard Lempert, Why Do Juries Get a Bum Rap? Reflections on the Work
of Valerie Hans, 48 DEPAUL L. REv. 453, 459 (1998).
5. Theodore B. Olson, The Parasitic Destruction of America's Civil Justice
System, 47 SMU L. REV. 359, 359 (1994).
6. 509 U.S. 443, 500 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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on juries. Professor Cass Sunstein has led this effort, employing the
methodology of behavioral economics to question juries' abilities to
award punitive damages rationally.7 Punitive awards, writes Sunstein,
are likely to occur through jurors' "erratic and unpredictable cognitive
processes."8 Sunstein and others suggest that the problem is sufficiently
severe that the power to award punitive damages should be transferred
from citizen-jurors to bureaucrats.9
One striking feature of this critique is its similarity to critiques of
criminal jury nullification. Jury nullification as commonly discussed
(and as we will discuss it here) occurs when a jury acquits a defendant
despite finding facts that leave no reasonable doubt as to guilt.'0
7. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURIES
DECIDE 29 (2002) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN ET AL., How JURIES DECIDE]; David Schkade et
al., Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139, 1139
(2000) (stating that deliberation increases the scope of punitive awards); Cass R.
Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in
Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2074 (1998) [hereinafter Sunstein et al., Assessing]
(collecting experiment results and discussing the inability of jurors to produce
nonarbitrary results); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Do People Want Optimal Deterrence?, 29
J. LEGAL STUD. 237, 246-47, 250 (2000) [hereinafter Sunstein et al., Optimal
Deterrence] (concluding that individuals will not apply deterrence-based jury instructions
in awarding punitive damages).
8. SUNSTEIN ET AL., How JURIES DECIDE, supra note 7, at 240.
9. Id. at 252-55.
10. This definition is widely agreed upon. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Jury
Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1149, 1150 (1997); Paul Butler,
Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105
YALE L.J. 677, 700 (1995). Butler states:
Jury nullification occurs when a jury acquits a defendant who it believes is
guilty of the crime with which he is charged. In finding the defendant not
guilty, the jury refuses to be bound by the facts of the case or the judge's
instructions regarding the law. Instead, the jury votes its conscience.
Id.; Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253, 253 (1996)
("Nullification occurs when the defendant's guilt is clear beyond a reasonable doubt, but
the jury, based on its own sense of justice or fairness, decides to acquit."); Lars Noah,
Civil Jury Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1601, 1604 (2001) ("Nullification occurs
whenever a jury intentionally ignores the trial judge's instructions on the applicable
law."); Jack B. Weinstein, Considering Jury "Nullification": When May and Should a
Jury Reject the Law to Do Justice, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 239, 239 (1993)
("Nullification occurs when a jury-based on its own sense of justice or fairness-
refuses to follow the law and convict in a particular case even though the facts seem to
allow no other conclusion but guilt."); see also Clay S. Conrad, Jury Nullification as a
Defense Strategy, 2 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1, 1 (1995-1996) ("The doctrine [of jury
nullification] holds that jurors in criminal cases have the right to judge not only the facts,
but the law as well."). The phenomenon has many labels depending on who is
discussing it, including "jury lawlessness" and "jury independence." See CLAY S.
CONRAD, JURY NULLIFICATION: THE EVOLUTION OF A DOCTRINE 6-7 (1998) [hereinafter
CONRAD, EVOLUTION] (advocating use of term "jury independence"). For purposes of
this Article, the widely recognized label of nullification will be used.
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Such acquittals are controversial. " Critics complain that they
exceed the jury's power and that they therefore undermine the "rule of
law." 2 But defenders of jury nullification protest that it fits within a
broad conception of the "rule of law." 13
In the civil context, the question of whether punitive damages fall
within the rule of law has just begun to be raised. ' 4 Until recently, rule
of law critiques of the jury's power in civil cases were anecdotal: juries
were said to be "unpredictable."' 5 The proposed remedy was the case-
by-case application of remittitur (or reducing awards postverdict). 6 The
A small number of articles have discussed the phenomenon of civil jury
nullification. See generally Noah, supra. Jury nullification in the civil context consists
of ignoring liability rules that the jury believes are unjust, such as the contributory
negligence rule. See id. at 1612-18 (discussing nullification of the contributory
negligence rule); see also David E. Bernstein, The Breast Implant Fiasco, 87 CAL. L.
REV. 457, 461 (1999) (book review) (noting "nullification" of the causation requirement
by jury); Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-in-Fact Rules for
Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CAL. L. REV. 881, 898 (1982) (noting that a jury could find
civil liability through nullification).
11. We recognize that under a more expansive definition, nullification could
result in conviction. Of course, it is important to confine jury nullification to examples
of verdicts contrary to fact-finding by the jury, because otherwise nullification would be
simple disagreement between the judge and the jury (or scholars, or the public at large)
about what "actually happened." A good example of non-nullification, by our
definition, is the O.J. Simpson case. But we recognize that many readers-including
several who read this paper in draft-believe that pro-prosecution criminal jury
nullification is practically more significant than the well-studied pro-defendant variant.
Such nullification occurs where a jury finds a defendant guilty despite finding facts that
do not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Pro-prosecution nullification is
probably quite common. However, we exclude it from our limited definition for the
purposes of simplicity. We note that judges have the power, through postverdict
motions, to remedy pro-prosecution nullification. We have been unable to find any
scholarship calling for an expansion of pro-prosecution nullification (for example,
permitting prosecutors to argue that jurors are free to ignore the reasonable doubt
instruction because they are "the judges of the law"). See CONRAD, EVOLUTION, supra
note 10, at 70 (arguing that nullification generally works in a defendant's favor only);
see also Alan Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a
Controversy, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 51, 59 (1980) ("Because the jury could
only mitigate the harshness of the law ... [jury nullification] did not raise any due
process problems."); cf. Weinstein, supra note 10, at 239 n.2 (noting that in general,
courts' ability to set aside guilty verdicts serves to prevent nullification that results in a
conviction).
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 10, at 1197-1200.
14. See David A. Hoffman, How Relevant is Jury Rationality?, 2003 U. ILL. L.
REV. 507, 519-23 (book review) (discussing the relationship between recent literature
and rule of law concerns).
15. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 172 (6th prtg.
1949) ("A better instrument could scarcely be imagined for achieving uncertainty,
capriciousness, lack of uniformity, disregard of former decisions-utter
unpredictability.").
16. See generally Snyder, supra note 1.
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recent attacks on juries by Sunstein and others invigorate this rule of law
based attack by enlisting empirical data showing that juries consistently
reject economic rationality. 7 This new empirical evidence has led
scholars to the same end as that reached in the jury nullification context:
juries must be stripped of their power.
We believe that some kinds of punitive damages have much in
common with nullification.'" Because of these similarities, an
examination of punitive damages through the lens of nullification can
shed some new light on the debate about their appropriateness. In
particular, understanding why and how nullification became
delegitimized helps us understand what is currently happening in the
17. See Hoffman, supra note 14, at 508-10 (discussing the rise of paternalism
in response to social science data).
18. A few scholars have noted potential conceptual links between jury
nullification and punitive damages. See David E. Hogg, Alabama Adopts De Novo
Review for Punitive Damage Appeals: Another Landmark Decision or Much Ado About
Nothing?, 54 ALA. L. REV. 223, 239 (2002) (stating that punitive damages may be "the
civil equivalent of jury nullification" (internal quotations omitted)); Roger W. Kirst,
Judicial Control of Punitive Damage Verdicts: A Seventh Amendment Perspective, 48
SMU L. REV. 63, 88 (1994) (indicating that "the jury nullification theme.., has not
been completely absent" from the case law and scholarly debate about the role of
punitive damages); see also John Alan Cohan, Obesity, Public Policy, and Tort Claims
Against Fast-Food Companies, 12 WIDENER L.J. 103, 129-30 (2003) ("We are
witnessing a trend in jury nullification to counter caps on punitive damages by
transmitting punitive damage awards into pain-and-suffering damages."); Gerard N.
Magliocca, The Philosopher's Stone: Dualist Democracy and the Jury, 69 U. COLO. L.
REv. 175, 193 n.93 (1998) ("One point worthy of further examination is whether civil
punitive damage awards constitute a signaling device comparable to jury nullification.");
cf. Lisa Litwiller, Has the Supreme Court Sounded the Death Knell for Jury Assessed
Punitive Damages? A Critical Re-Examination of the American Jury, 36 U.S.F. L. REV.
411, 467 (2002) ("[Right to jury trial is said to be important] because the framers
believed that individual participation in the democratic process could be accomplished
only through the check juries placed on both the legislative branches, through jury
nullification, and the judicial branch . . . ." (footnote omitted)); Nancy S. Marder,
Juries and Technology: Equipping Jurors for the Twenty-First Century, 66 BROOK. L.
REV. 1257, 1259 (2001) (noting similarity between limitations on jury nullification and
limitations on punitive damages). But see Neal R. Feigenson, Can Tort Juries Punish
Competently?, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 239, 280 (2003) (book review) ("[Dliscrepancies
between judges' and juries' punitive damage decisions may reflect legitimate, justifiable
disagreements about the policies or values reflected in the law and its application to the
case rather than, say, jury nullification or unwitting deviation from the legal norm.").
Finally, a recent article by Jenia Iontcheva discusses attempts to take powers away from
juries to set criminal sentences and suggests that studies of punitive juries provide only
limited support for the ideas that juries in general behave inconsistently. See Jenia
Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311, 354-77
(2003).
There is little scholarship at all addressing the ability of civil juries to nullify laws.
One major exception to that general rule is Lars Noah's excellent piece on civil jury
nullification. Noah's article concentrates on liability rules of tort, such as the
cnntribu!ory negligence rule. See Noah, supra note 10, at 1612-18.
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punitive damages debate. The similarity between these two debates
leads us to a renewed appreciation of what we will call the "nullificatory
jury": a jury that acts outside of its normal role as a finder of established
fact and instead plays a part in the construction of social policy.
The Article discusses the proper role such nullificatory juries play
in the legal system. Most significantly, nullificatory juries serve to
reinforce the legal system's focus on particular cases and controversies.
Jurors, unlike some scholars and judges, privilege deontological,
commonsense ideas of what is right over utilitarian, elite ideas of what
is efficient. In short, nullificatory juries protect us from rule by legal
economists.
Part I of this Article describes the law and history of punitive
damages, discusses the scholarly debate about these awards, and treats
in particular detail economic and behavioral analyses. Part II discusses
the similarities between criticisms of punitive damages and those of jury
nullification and concludes by discussing in some detail the concept we
call the nullificatory jury. Part III discusses the two most common
explanations offered by scholars for describing the genesis of
nullification: dissatisfaction with utilitarian legal rules and race. Part IV
examines certain mechanisms by which scholars have proposed to
control the powers of nullificatory juries. Part V discusses why
nullificatory juries ought to play an ongoing role in our legal system, in
the context of both relatively unconstrained punitive awards and
nullification. We propose three roles nullificatory juries would properly
serve: a protective function-guarding against capricious government
acts; an equitable function-ameliorating harsh consequences of just
laws; and a participatory function-engaging in dialogue with
lawmakers. We conclude by providing some observations about the
relationship between the legal-professional culture and lay citizens and
by suggesting empirical investigations to help guide normative work in
this controversial area of the law.
I. THE BEHAVIORAL CRITIQUE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
This Part briefly discusses the law of punitive damages and the
critiques of these damages. Section A sets out black-letter law on
punitive damages, including an abbreviated history. This Section is
descriptive and intended to facilitate discussion of punitive damages
throughout the Article. Section B then collects critiques from the
literature to create a relatively novel chronology and analysis of the
economic critique of punitive damages. This history, while also still




A. Law of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are the award by a civil jury of a verdict in an
amount exceeding that necessary to compensate the victim of a legal
harm. 9 At least seven different justifications for punitive damages have
been advanced by courts and scholars in support of their existence: "(1)
punishing the defendant; (2) deterring the defendant from repeating the
offense; (3) deterring others from committing an offense; (4) preserving
the peace; (5) inducing private law enforcement; (6) compensating
victims for otherwise uncompensable losses; and (7) paying the
plaintiff's attorneys' fees."20
In jurisdictions permitting punitive awards, juries are typically
instructed that they may award punitive damages in certain causes of
action. The damages are generally subject to standards such as the
"jury's sound discretion, exercised without passion or prejudice."' 21
Jurors usually are further instructed that they are to consider the
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct and the amount of damages
that will have a deterrent effect in light of the defendant's financial
condition.22  These instructions often "leave the jury with wide
discretion in choosing amounts. ,23
Punitive damages are part of the nation's common-law history.
They arose from English criminal law, became a separate civil remedy
in English law in the mid-eighteenth century,25 and were awarded for the
first time in the United States in 1791.26 In that year, a New Jersey
court, measuring the proper damages owed a young woman by her
seducer (for breach of the promise to marry), was confronted with a
dilemma.27 The defendant had already paid, in a separate suit, the full
compensatory award to the victim's father. 2' The defendant's counsel
argued that payment to the actual tort victim would create a double
19. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1981).
20. Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive
Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 3 (1982). Ellis suggests another possible purpose,
revenge, in passing. Id. at n. 10.
21. CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL [BAJI], § 14.71, at 248 (Comm. on
Standard Jury Instructions of the Super. Ct. of L.A. County, Cal., 9th ed. 2002).
22. Id.
23. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1520
(2003) (quoting Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994)).
24. See Alan Calnan, Ending the Punitive Damage Debate, 45 DEPAUL L.
REv. 101, 106 (1995).
25. See Litwiller, supra note 18, at 424-26.
26. See James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic
That Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1124 (1984) (concluding that
the early rationales for punitive damages no longer justify their imposition).
27. See Litwiller, supra note 18, at 426.
28. Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 90, 90 (1791).
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recovery.29 New Jersey's chief justice rejected this plea for efficiency,
condemning the tortfeasor's "most atrocious and dishonorable" conduct,
and instructed the jury that "they were not to estimate the damages by
any particular proof of suffering or actual loss" but should "give
damages for example's sake, to prevent such offences in [the] future."30
Early civil courts, following the New Jersey model, took up the gap
left between relatively harsh punishments for damages to property and
relatively mild criminal sanctions for damages to rights such as
reputation.3' Punitive damages thus served a "quasi-criminal" function
in the law;32 they punished especially egregious tortfeasors.33 Early
critics of punitive awards protested that such quasi-criminal damages
were "foreign to, and logically inconsistent with" the idea of
compensatory tort law.' However, either because such criticisms were
unpersuasive or because of the moderate variation in awards, few judges
exercised their remittitur powers."
By the end of the century, punitive damages increased in frequency
and magnitude, as several scholars have documented.3 6  In reaction,
judges began using remittitur with increased frequency, acting (it was
said) "because jurors will not do the right thing towards
'corporations."' 37  Some scholars have suggested that in reality this
trend to remove punitive power from juries was related to the end of the
all-white, all-male venire.3" By the beginning of the twentieth century,
the use of remittitur became "commonplace." 39
29. Id.
30. Id. at 91.
31. See Sales & Cole, supra note 26, at 1123.
32. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991); see also Thomas
B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as Punishment
for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583, 605 n.70 (2003).
33. Of course, this quasi-criminal component to awards has not been
uncontroversial. When the state has "highly specialized police agencies,"
"[k]nowledgeable judges," and "[violuminous criminal codes," the need for punitive
damages is said to be "completely obviated." Calnan, supra note 24, at 111-12; see
also Sales & Cole, supra note 26, at 1124.
34. Litwiller, supra note 18, at 428.
35. Snyder, supra note 1, at 307-10.
36. See id. at 316-18 (suggesting causes including increased dislocation from
the Industrial Revolution and doctrinal shifts).
37. Hon. Eli Shelby Hammond, Personal Injury Litigation, 6 YALE L.J. 328,
331 (1896-1897).
38. Laura Gaston Dooley, Our Juries, Our Selves: The Power, Perception, and
Politics of the Civil Jury, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 325, 353-56 (1995); cf Douglas G.
Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV.
377, 445 (1996) (suggesting this connection between removing the jury's power and the
all-male, all-white jury).
39. See Snyder, supra note 1, at 317. Although the effect of such attacks on
jury's damage practices is hard to make out, at least one scholar has calculated that
between 1870 and 1910 the average personal injury case returned less damages to
2003:1115 1121
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In recent years, the Supreme Court has imposed due process limits
on punitive awards. The Court has held that the constitutionally
sanctioned goals of punitive damages are "deterrence and retribution"4"
and has effectively imposed a cap on the amount of any given award.
Generally, courts reviewing punitive damage awards for arbitrariness
must consider: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm
suffered and the punitive award; and (3) the difference between any
particular award and those in comparable cases.4 In practice, "few
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages will satisfy due process. "42
B. Economic and Behavioral Critiques of Punitive Damages
Punitive damage awards have been subject to severe scholarly and
public criticism. 3 Exchanges between the defenders of punitive awards
and their critics grow ever more sharp. It is said to have become
impossible to organize a neutral academic conference on the subject."
There is no consensus justifying punitive damages on any particular
ground.45  Some suggested theories-such as revenge or retribution-
offer a great deal of leeway to juries in the proper awards of punitive
damages. In contrast, certain deterrence theories offer juries a very
constrained kind of decision-making that rejects as inefficient and thus
impermissible all but specifically deterrent punitive damage awards.
The most important advocates of deterrence rationales for punitive
damages are scholars who use a law-and-economics approach to the
law-so-called "legal economists." Legal economists came relatively
late to the punitive damages debate. The first important symposium at
claimants. Id. at 319; see also Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical
Continuity of Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L.
REV. 1269, 1294 (1993) (discussing the history of punitive damages).
40. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1519.
41. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996).
42. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1516.
43. The corpus of criticism is vast. Some illustrative examples follow. Ellis,
supra note 20, at 3 (criticizing functions of punitive awards); David G. Owen, The
Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 705, 726-38 (1989) (arguing
that punitive doctrine needs to change to accommodate moral limitations on permissible
awards); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic
Analysis, I 11 HARV. L. REV. 869, 876 n. 12 (1998) (collecting scholarship).
44. See Galanter, supra note 1, at 751 ("Like post-modernist academics, many
combatants in the civil justice wars seem to have lost sight of the notion that the
knowledge produced by disciplined inquiry is not reducible to partisan advocacy.").
45. Calnan, supra note 24, at 110-21 (criticizing punitive damage theories for
lacking a coherent and defensible rationale).
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which the legal economists analyzed punitive damages was in 1982.46
At that symposium, Professor Dorsey Ellis, a legal economist, presented
Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages.47  Ellis
articulated the basic premise of efficiency analysis: compensatory
damages "ordinarily will produce efficient results" absent the need for
further punishment.4 s Certain exceptions justified the limited use of
punitive damages-that (1) where the "probability of liability" was less
than the "probability of loss"; (2) where expected damages were less
than expected losses; and (3) where the costs of avoiding liability were
higher than those recognized by compensatory laws.49
These exceptions assumed a regime where the law was clear and
consistently applied. Unfortunately, Ellis argued, legal standards for
punitive awards were "vague," and "ad hoc" juries were the decision-
makers.50 Ellis theorized that this jury decision-making would create
higher costs, overdeterrence, uncertainty, and, therefore, inefficiency. 5
He concluded that the case for punitive damages was "a limited one.,,
5 2
Recognizing that empirical findings about jury performance were
necessary before it could be definitively established that "punitive
damages [do] not promote efficiency, '5 3 Ellis wrote that the "intuitive
arguments supporting the proposition are weaker than those against it.,,
54
In other words, Ellis had a hunch that juries were undermining
efficiency. The implication was clear that if the data proved the hunch,
juries, and not efficiency, would have to go.
Professor Gary Schwartz, also a legal economist, commented on
Ellis's piece and criticized him for conflating the two primary rationales
of deterrence and punishment.55 As Schwartz pointed out, any analysis
based on deterrence called for changes in the law instead of describing
46. See Symposium, Punitive Damages Articles, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1982).
Interestingly, this symposium followed closely on an important scholarly debate about
the moral foundations of law and economics. See David A. Hoffman & Michael P.
O'Shea, Can Law and Economics Be Both Practical and Principled?, 53 ALA. L. REV.
335, 347 (2002) (describing discourse between 1979 and 1981). Following that debate,
wealth maximization-the then-extant norm which justified normative work in law and
economics-was "significantly discredited." Id. at 350.
47. See generally Ellis, supra note 20.
48. Id. at 23.
49. Id. at 25-33.
50. Id. at 36-38.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 76.
53. Id. at 77.
54. Id.
55. See generally Gary T. Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the
Common Law of Punitive Damages: A Comment, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 133 (1982) (noting




it;56 deterrence was "wholly inadequate for the task of describing our
existing common law of punitive damages." 57 Schwartz, turning to the
more descriptive punishment rationale, found this type of rationale "in
trouble" because punitive damage awards failed to satisfy many of the
prerequisites for a just penal system.5" Schwartz noted a general tension
between punitive damages and efficiency.59
These discussions made clear to legal economists that if they were
to present proposals to reform punitive damages, such proposals would
be based on the deterrence rationale and would have to be frankly
normative. Such normative proposals soon became a popular outlet of
law and economics scholarship.' The normative goal was to alleviate
the problem of "lawless" awards by providing clear, enforceable
standards for punitive awards. 6' By focusing on "incentives" rather than
"motives," economic analysis could avoid the traps of excessive and
unprincipled awards, and could increase "incentives to conform to the
law. ',62
Early legal economists recognized that jurors might pose an
impediment to rationalizing the punitive damages regime. Although
evidence about jury decision-making was limited, 63 "the incentives for
individual jurors, and juries collectively, to decide cases
correctly ... are weak at best."" Researchers also noted anecdotal
evidence that jurors were disgusted by the very efficiency-based
rationales that legal economists were proposing. Schwartz, writing in
1982 about the Ford Pinto case, 65 concluded that if "juries are drawn-
as they must be-from the general population, it seems unrealistic to
expect the jury to disregard this basic belief [in moral illegitimacy of
cost-benefit analysis] either in determining liability or in ruling on
punitive damages."' Thus, efficiency-based theories could "hardly be
expected to produce generally satisfactory results when it is administered
56. Id. at 140.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 146.
59. See id. at 151-52.
60. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence: When and
How Much?, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1143, 1149-66 (1989); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note
43, at 876 n. 12.
61. Cooter, supra note 60, at 1144-45.
62. Id. at 1194.
63. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Alan Reifman, Juror Comprehension and
Public Policy: Perceived Problems and Proposed Solutions, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y &
L. 788, 789 (2000) (difficulty in persuading legal academics to take juror research
seriously).
64. Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Punitive Damages, Due Process, and the Jury, 40
ALA. L. REV. 975, 997 (1989) [hereinafter Ellis, Punitive Damages].
65. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981).
66. See Schwartz, supra note 55, at 152.
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by a lay jury."67 However, such conclusions were tentative and
anecdotal.68 Schwartz even suggested elsewhere that lawyers could
convince jurors to accept efficiency-based thinking.69
Legal economists continued to propose "model" punitive damage
instructions that would comport punitive damages with economic
efficiency.7" Such damages would be predictable and act to deter actual
and potential wrongdoers perfectly. This scholarship culminated in a
1998 article, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, by legal
economists Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell. 7' Polinsky and
Shavell concluded that damages should be "imposed when deterrence
otherwise would be inadequate because of the possibility that injurers
would escape liability. 72 In practice, this meant that damages should be
set by "multiplying the inverse of the probability of detection of the
tortfeasor's actions by the amount of the compensatory award that would
compensate the victim's loss." 73 Polinsky and Shavell proposed model
jury instructions as a guide for juries to reach socially efficient results.74
This reformation of punitive damages rested on an untested
empirical assumption that juries would be willing to apply deterrence
formulas in practice. Several scholars had doubts that this premise
would prove to be true in practice." This anecdotal account began to
change, however, in the late 1990s as several prominent scholars began
to publish articles analyzing how juries made decisions relating to
punitive damages and how they reacted to deterrence-based punitive
damage instructions.76 These studies arose out of a revolutionary attack
on the traditional law and economics movement, known as the
67. Id. at 152-53.
68. See Richard Lempert, Juries, Hindsight, and Punitive Damage Awards:
Failures of a Social Science Case for Change, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 867, 892 (1999).
69. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1013, 1038 (1991).
70. See, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 43.
71. Id. While examining the role of punishment, Polinsky and Shavell discount
its usefulness as a way to justify damage awards. Id. at 955. Not only do they rule out
punishing corporations as inefficient, but they state that the imposition of damages
"when they are not justified on deterrence grounds generally has socially detrimental
consequences." Id.
72. Id. at 954.
73. Hoffman & O'Shea, supra note 46, at 399 (citing Cass R. Sunstein et al.,
Do People Want Optimal Deterrence?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 237, 238 (2000)). This
formulation is similar to the cost-benefit analysis suggested by Judge Learned Hand as a
guide in tort cases. See Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula
Balancing, the Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REV. 813, 860
(2001) (discussing reactions to the "Hand formula").
74. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 43, at 957-62.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 63-69.
76. See Hoffman, supra note 14, at 523-26.
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neoclasssical school, and specifically on the neoclassical assumption that
people will behave in economically "rational" ways.77
That attack, known in shorthand as the behavioralist or
behavioralism movement, consists of the application of laboratory
studies about decision-making to analyses of how legal rules should be
structured and applied.78 One of behavioralism's main contributions is
to establish, using laboratory research by psychologists, that people are
unlikely to make decisions based on "'good reasons and with as much
information as possible."'
79
Behavioralists argue that individuals' choices deviate from the
neoclassical model of rationality in relatively predictable ways. For
example, individuals are subject to cognitive biases or "deviations and
cognitive illusions" that lead them to make errors in evaluating
outcomes of choices they have made.8° Individuals are also subject to
confirmation biases, which cause them to fail to evaluate information
that contradicts their previously held beliefs. 8' These imperfect choices,
many argue, strengthen the case for constraining individual choice
through paternalistic reforms.82 Significantly, these proposed reforms
77. See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to
Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23
(1989) (critiquing traditional law and economics for assuming that individuals would be
rational actors); Hoffman & O'Shea, supra note 46, at 359-63 (discussing laboratory
results that undermined the rationality assumption of neoclassical law and economics).
78. An important trilogy of behavioralism articles, summarizing a number of
studies, is by Professors Jon Hanson and Douglas Kysar. See generally Jon D. Hanson
and Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A Response to Market
Manipulation, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 259 (2000); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A.
Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, The Problem of Market
Manipulation]; Jon D. Hanson and Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously:
Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1999). For a general
review of the behavioralism literature, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The "New" Law and
Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL. L.
REV. 739 (2000), and Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Stumbling Block: Freedom, Rationality,
and Legal Scholarship, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 263, 371 (2002) (critiquing behavioral
economists for their "unreflexive form of normative discussion").
79. Jeanne L. Schroeder, Rationality in Law and Economics Scholarship, 79
OR. L. REV. 147, 152 (2000) (quoting MARK BLAUG, THE METHODOLOGY OF
EcONOMICS OR How ECONOMISTS EXPLAIN 229 (2d ed. 1992)).
80. Hanson & Kysar, The Problem of Market Manipulation, supra note 78, at
645.
81. Id. at 650.
82. See Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175, 1178 (1997) ("Recent revisions in understanding human behavior greatly unsettle
certain arguments against paternalism in law .... [T]hey support a form of anti-
antipaternalism."); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for
Paternalism, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1165, 1166 (2003) ("Virtually every scholar who has
written on the application of psychological research on judgment and choice to law has
concluded that cognitive psychology supports institutional constraint on individual
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are justified by their benefit to society, not the individual whose choices
are to be constrained.
83
In the context of the punitive damages debate, behavioralism offers
an additional-and perhaps contrary-insight. Jurors do not reject
consequentialist reasoning (that is, an efficient damages instruction)
arbitrarily; they reject it consistently and purposefully. In a series of
experiments first announced in the mid- to late-1990s, scholars found
that jurors were unwilling to accept efficiency as a rationale for legal
decisions-and, specifically, refused to apply the Polinsky-Shavell jury
instructions.'
In a preliminary experiment, even University of Chicago law
students-well conditioned to apply economic norms-refused to apply
optimal deterrence policies for determining punitive awards by
"overwhelming majorities." 85  In a later experiment, specifically
applying the Polinsky-Shavell instructions, only fifteen percent of
respondents could (or would) apply the deterrence calculus.86 Mock
jurors awarded damages based on punishment norms despite being
specifically instructed to the contrary.87
Significantly, members of minority groups and women were
disproportionately hostile to the punitive damages efficiency calculus. 8
Women rejected "efficient" damages five percent more than men;
choice."). But cf. Hoffman & O'Shea, supra note 46, at 414-15 (describing and
critiquing paternalist conclusions of behavioralist scholars). A number of scholars have
attacked the logical and methodological links between paternalism and behavioralism.
See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 14, at 509-10 (describing paternalist reactions to
behavioralism and arguing that paternalism is not justified by behavioralism per se); see
also Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted
Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907
(2002) (describing paternalist reactions to behavioralism and arguing that paternalism is
not justified by behavioralism per se); Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics'
Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal
Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 85-125 (2002) (discussing flawed methodology of
behavioral law and economics); Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages: Should Juries
Decide?, 28 TEx. L. REV. 381, 398-411 (2003) (describing the "gap between the
descriptive empirical data and the normative policy reforms advocated in light of the
data").
83. Cf. Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral
Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1212
(2003) (noting the difference between paternalism for the benefit of a controlled
individual and the more harmful paternalism for the gain of society).
84. See SUNSTEIN ET AL., How JURIES DECIDE, supra note 7, at 163; Polinsky
& Shavell, supra note 43, at 957-62 (explaining their proposed jury instructions); cf.
Sharkey, supra note 82, at 395-98 (criticizing the optimal deterrence jury experiments).
85. Sunstein et al., Optimal Deterrence, supra note 7, at 246.
86. See W. Kip Viscusi, The Challenge of Punitive Damages Mathematics, 30
J. LEGAL STUD. 313, 325-26 (2001).
87. Id. at 316, 335-39, 342-43.
88. Id. at 338.
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Latinos of both genders rejected such damages at a rate eight percent
higher than whites; 9 and Blacks' were eleven percent less likely to
award efficient damages than whites.9 The study's author rejected any
explanation that different education levels account for these differing
responses, and stated that "[a] more compelling explanation is that many
respondents were simply unwilling to carry out these instructions."92
It makes some sense that women and minorities react differently to
certain kinds of statistical and risk analysis arguments than white men.93
However, citizens' explicit reactions against the very damages
instructions that legal economists had proposed to rescue punitive
damages for the rule of law provided significant ammunition to those
who believe that punitive damages must be reformed and perhaps
eliminated. 94 Scholars proposing radical solutions such as eliminating
punitive damages in favor of a new bureaucracy cite these data as
providing the necessary support for reform.95 These data, moreover, fit
well within an emerging body of data establishing that jurors reject
utilitarian legal analysis and have a positive preference for deontological
(that is, not consequential) morality.96
89. Viscusi, supra note 86, at 339-40.
90. Throughout this Article we will use the term "Black" rather than "black"
or "African-American." See generally Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform,
and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988).
91. Viscusi, supra note 86, at 339-40.
92. Id. at 338.
93. See Paul Slovic, Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics and Science: Surveying the
Risk-Assessment Battlefield, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 390-412 (Paul Slovic ed.,
2000) (arguing that risk analysis is subjective and subject to demographic differences).
94. See Hoffman, supra note 14, at 526 ("[Tjhis data is what has motivated the
paternalism that increasingly marks the work of [certain legal economists] .... [T]he
data about juror reactions to cost-benefit balancing is an explicit rejection of the
paternalists' idealized system."). It has not escaped lawyers' attentions that such anti-
utilitarian preferences provide a powerful argument against punitive damages. In State
Farm, an amicus brief relied almost entirely on the previously discussed laboratory
work. Brief of Amicus Curiae Certain Leading Business Corporations in Support of
Petitioner, State Farm, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (No. 01-1289).
95. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN ET AL., How JURIES DECIDE, supra note 7, at 242,
245-58.
96. See Hoffman & O'Shea, supra note 46, at 394-407 (describing "anti-
utilitarian preferences"); Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectation of Consumers, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1700, 1738 n.167 (2003) (jurors refuse to engage in "taboo trade-
offs"); Robert A. Prentice & Jonathan J. Koehler, A Normality Bias in Legal Decision
Making, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 583, 586 n.5 (2003) (collecting studies); Jennifer K.
Robbennolt et al., Symbolism and Incommensurability in Civil Sanctioning: Decision
Makers as Goal Managers, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1134-39 (2003) (describing
resistance to cost benefit analysis as rooted in everyday moral intuitions). Judges are
subject to this preference too, albeit at lower observed rates. See SUNSTEIN ET AL., How
JURIES DECIDE, supra note 7, at 207; W. Kip Viscusi, How Do Judges Think About
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II. SIMILARITIES TO RULE-OF-LAW CRITIQUES OF JURY
NULLIFICATION: THE NULLIFICATORY JURY
The behavioralist critique of punitive damages has been based on
the invocation of certain rhetorical keywords-"ad hoc," "irrational,"
"arbitrary," and "lawless." 97  These keywords are also used in the
critiques of a phenomenon that seems unrelated: jury nullification. We
are struck by the similarities between the behavioral critique of punitive
damages and the similarly phrased critiques of jury nullification. Jury
nullification, once a fixture in the legal system, faced withering critiques
charging that it was contrary to the rule of law. Jury nullification critics
succeeded in severely curtailing the practice; it now exists only on the
fringe of legal procedure.
Section A briefly discusses the history of jury nullification
including its current legal status. Section B then analyzes the various
incarnations of the rule-of-law critique that have emerged in this area of
the law. Section C discusses the similarities between the rule-of-law
critiques of jury nullification and the economic critiques of punitive
damages. Section D theorizes that punitive damage awards, like jury
nullification, may be a result of a particular type of jury behavior and
introduce these so-behaving "nullificatory juries."
A. Jury Nullification
Jury nullification, as noted above, is a verdict of acquittal by a
criminal jury despite facts showing guilt beyond reasonable doubt.9"
Jury nullification has become a subject of popular debate, due in part to
its perceived role in the highly publicized trials of O.J. Simpson and of
Rodney King's attackers.99 Jury nullification verdicts may be the result
of personal bias or animosity, disagreement with the law, moral
conviction that the law or its application is unjust, or even plain
laziness. "0
Nullification is an American tradition. It has a centuries-old history
in common law and was extremely popular in the colonies.'' It played
Risk?, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 26, 43 (1999) (noting that judges departed from
economic analysis when confronted with harm to persons).
97. See infra Part II.B.
98. See supra note 10 and accompanying text; cf. supra text accompanying
note 11.
99. See Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 Nw. U. L. REV.
877, 877-78 (1999) (noting media perceptions of the Rodney King and O.J. Simpson
cases as the products of jury nullification). But cf. supra text accompanying note 11.
100. Brown, supra note 10, at 1150 (noting possible reasons).
101. Nullification in common law dates to 1649. See CONRAD, EVOLUTION,
supra note 10, at 20, 23 (discussing the use of jury nullification in the trial of John
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an important political role at several points in American history,
including being a popular means of noncompliance with fugitive slave
laws.' 02 However, the practice was criticized heavily by judges in the
latter half of the nineteenth century. In 1895, in the case of Sparf and
Hansen v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the defendants had
no right to instruct juries of their power to nullify.'03 Since then, jury
nullification has "gone underground," so to speak. Juries may still
render nullification verdicts, but cannot be told of their power to do so.
This unusual combination makes the phenomenon even more
unpredictable, which in turn has led to calls for a more complete ban on
nullification. 04
Some modem scholars have advocated a greater ability to inform
juries of their nullification power. ' The discussion has generated
articles opposing broader rights to jury nullification, and a lengthy
modem literature on jury nullification.'0 6
Lilburne and suggesting that nullification arose "from a reluctance to impose the death
penalty for minor or forgivable offenses"); Phillip B. Scott, Jury Nullification: An
Historical Perspective on a Modern Debate, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 389, 398-99 (1989)
(discussing jury nullification historically); see also THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT
ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY
1200-1800, at 28-35 (1985) (suggesting that low conviction rates in medieval England
reflects unrecorded practice of nullification). Nullification became more famous after its
successful use in the defense of William Penn. See GREEN, supra, at 202-36; Scott,
supra, at 394-95 (discussing the Penn trial).
Early colonial juries were also quick to adopt nullification, most prominently in
the libel trial of printer John Peter Zenger. See generally JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF
NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER (1963). See also Paul
Finkelman, Politics the Press, and the Law: The Trial of John Peter Zenger, in
AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS 25, 27-28 (Michal R. Belknap ed., 1994); Eben Moglen,
Considering Zenger: Partisan Politics and the Legal Profession in Provincial New York,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 1495, 1497 & n.5 (1994).
102. See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL
OF DEMOCRACY 80-82 (1994); Butler, supra note 10, at 703.
103. 156 U.S. 51, 106-07 (1895); see also Brown, supra note 10, at 1160,
1177; Noah, supra note 10, at 1621. Jurors may still be told of their nullificatory power
in a handful of states. M. Kristine Creagan, Jury Nullification: Assessing Recent
Legislative Developments, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1101, 1101-02 (1993).
104. See, e.g., Leipold, supra note 10, at 317-23.
105. See, e.g., CONRAD, EVOLUTION, supra note 10, at 3-7; Scheflin & Van
Dyke, supra note 11, at 103-08.
106. See, e.g., CONRAD, EVOLUTION, supra note 10; Brown, supra note 10;
Leipold, supra note 10.
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B. The Rule of Law Critique
Both older and more modern critiques of jury nullification have
focused on whether nullification is consistent with the rule of law. 107
The Supreme Court in Sparf and Hansen employed this argument,
writing that jury nullification would cause the government to "cease to
be a government of laws, and become a government of men."108 Similar
arguments are employed by modem critics of nullification to oppose
changes to the current system of nullification or to advocate greater
restrictions on nullification.
This critique is based on widespread respect for the idea of the rule
of law, which is a concept that describes an idealized vision of the
function of law. The rule of law requires that laws be general,
applicable to all citizens and (with some exceptions) nonretroactive.' °9
This concept, an idealized rule of law, is often held up as a contrast to
the "rule of persons," which is described as a state where the arbitrary
will of one or more persons has the force of law. "0
One form of the rule-of-law critique is the labeling of nullification
as "jury lawlessness" by courts and academics."' Thus, the Supreme
Court in Strickland v. Washington grouped nullification, along with
"arbitrariness, whimsy, [and] caprice," as an example of lawlessness." 2
The U.S. courts of appeals have expressed similar sentiments, with the
D.C. Circuit writing that nullification "verdicts are lawless, a denial of
due process and constitute an exercise of erroneously seized power";"
3
the Fourth Circuit holding that allowing an instruction on nullification
"would indeed be negating the rule of law in favor of the rule of
107. See Brown, supra note 10, at 1150; Butler, supra note 10, at 705 ("The
idea that jury nullification undermines the rule of law is the most common criticism of
the doctrine.").
108. Sparf& Hansen, 156 U.S. at 103.
109. See J.M. Balkin, Constitutional Interpretation and the Problem of History,
63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 911, 926-27 (1988) (book review); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The
Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7-9
(1997) (discussing components of the rule of law); see also Brown, supra note 10, at
1156-57 & n.28 (stating that the rule of law requires that laws be general, knowable,
and performable).
110. See Balkin, supra note 109, at 926; Fallon, supra note 109, at 5-6; cf.
Lynne Henderson, Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law, 66 IND. L.J. 379, 389-90
(1991).
111. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L.
REV. 12, 18 (1910).
112. 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984). The Court stated that "[ain assessment of the
likelihood of a result more favorable to the defendant must exclude the possibility of
arbitrariness, whimsy, caprice, 'nullification,' and the like. A defendant has no
entitlement to the luck of a lawless decisionmaker, even if a lawless decision cannot be
reviewed." Id.
113. United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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lawlessness";11 4 and the Second Circuit ruling that "in a society
committed to the rule of law, jury nullification is [not] desirable."" 5
This theme is echoed by commentators; one author writes that jury
nullification causes "catastrophic weakening of 'the most important
value of Western democracy': the rule of law."" 6 Nullification is also
criticized as antidemocratic, a critique that is rooted in concern about the
rule of law." 7  One commentator writes that "[b]y engaging in
nullification, jurors-who are not democratically elected-reject laws
established through a democratic process in order to apply standards-to
which they are not themselves subject-to individuals who had no
opportunity to vote in the process by which these standards were
selected. "1"8 Other scholars agree that nullification improperly subverts
democratically enacted laws."19  Such arguments highlight and
complement the more straightforward rule-of-law critique, and these
related arguments are often invoked together for mutual support. 20
The question of whether and how jury nullification actually offends
the rule of law is certainly unsettled. Scholars have had considerable
difficulty in translating the vague rule-of-law ideal into concrete legal
instructions. The idealized rule of law has very little normative content;
as scholars have noted, it even allows for many kinds of tyranny. '2  It is
114. United States v. Moylan, 417 F.3d 1002, 1006 (4th Cir. 1969). While
admitting that nullification was not something the court could practically control, given
the jury's ability to render a general verdict of innocent, the court wrote that "this is not
to say that the jury should be encouraged in their 'lawlessness."' Id.
115. United States v. Thomas, 116 F.2d 606, 614 (2d Cir. 1997).
116. Steven M. Warshawsky, Note, Opposing Jury Nullification: Law, Policy,
and Prosecutorial Strategy, 85 GEO. L.J. 191, 216-17 (1996) (quoting State v. Ragland,
519 A.2d 1361, 1371 (N.J. 1986)).
117. See Butler, supra note 10, at 705-09 (noting the democratic illegitimacy
argument); Noah, supra note 10, at 1625 ("Critics question the democratic legitimacy of
giving small panels of citizens the power to disregard the choices made by popularly
elected officials and their agents.").
118. Robert F. Schopp, Verdicts of Conscience: Nullification and Necessity as
Jury Responses to Crimes of Conscience, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 2039, 2058 (1996).
119. See, e.g., Richard St. John, Note, License to Nullify: The Democratic and
Constitutional Deficiencies of Authorized Jury Lawmaking, 106 YALE L.J. 2563, 2577-
97 (1997) (arguing that nullification lacks democratic legitimacy because it is done by
unrepresentative and unaccountable juries); Warshawsky, supra note 116, at 213
(arguing that "rather than being an expression of democracy, jury nullification is
fundamentally antidemocratic"); see also Leipold, supra note 10, at 295-301; Scott,
supra note 101, at 420-23; Gary J. Simson, Jury Nullification in the American System: A
Skeptical View, 54 TEx. L. REV. 488, 517-18 (1975).
120. See, e.g., Warshawsky, supra note 116, at 216-17 (arguing simultaneously
that jury nullification undermines the rule of law and that it subverts democratic
principles).
121. Henderson, supra note 110, at 400 ("There is nothing intrinsic to the Rule
of Law that entails absolute or even partial protection of individuals or groups from
tyranny and oppression."); cf. Fallon, supra note 109, at 5-6 (noting the existence of
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thus somewhat of a stretch to characterize jury nullification as
contravening such a flexible concept. Indeed, critics of nullification
seem to be injecting many of their own legal beliefs into their professed
defense of a universally accepted rule of law. Defenders of jury
nullification point to instances where nullification seems to be an
integral part of the rule of law. 1
22
However, the ideal of a rule of law has been employed to attack
nullification, and courts appear to have accepted these critiques. The
result is that courts have sharply curtailed nullification. The most
important of these decisions was the Supreme Court's ruling in Sparf
and Hansen, which eliminated most nullification arguments from federal
courts. In another case, the Second Circuit allowed removal of a juror
for a belief in nullification.' Similarly, commentators who have
argued that jury nullification contravenes the rule of law generally agree
that nullification should be limited.2 In contrast, commentators who
believe that nullification fits within the rule of law generally believe that
it should not be so limited. 1
25
The success of rule-of-law critiques in driving jury nullification
underground bears on the punitive damages debate, where (as we shall
see) similar arguments are being used.
C. Similar Punitive Damage Critiques
Punitive damages have not, as yet, been subject to the same intense
rule-of-law critique that delegitimized jury nullification.2 6 However,
competing versions of the rule of law); Weinstein, supra note 10, at 244 (noting that
Nazism rose under an alleged rule of law).
122. See Brown, supra note 10, at 1171.
123. Thomas, 116 F.3d at 614-25.
124. See, e.g., Leipold, supra note 10, at 294-301; Simson, supra note 119, at
512-18; Warshawsky, supra note 116, at 210-16. But cf. Butler, supra note 10, at 706
(conceding that jury nullification is outside the rule of law but advocating for it).
125. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 10, at 1183-90 (rebutting critique that
nullification is antidemocratic); Butler, supra note 10, at 709-14 (arguing that
nullification can serve to correct antiminority tendencies in the democratic process).
126. The particular version of the rule of law critique that was employed against
jury nullification was a formalist critique-that is, a critique which depends on the
conception that legal decisions ought to be made by the application of facially neutral
legal rules. See Brown, supra note 10, at 1158 (discussing the early formalist
conception of the rule of law). The defining feature of a formalist rendering of the rule
of law is "decisionmaking according to rule." Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE
L.J. 509, 510 (1988). Such decision-making must be guided by a "logical, objective,
and scientific process of deduction." See Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now,
76 CAL. L. REv. 465, 497 (1988) (book review). Therefore, jury decision-making,
marked by "unreliable, erratic, and unpredictable" results is inconsistent with formalist
ideologies that require more rational decision-makers. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at
241.
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the seeds of such a devastating attack on punitive damage awards are
present. At least two sitting Justices of the Supreme Court have argued
that punitive damages can undermine the rule of law. Justice O'Connor,
in her dissent in TXO Production Corporation, claimed that punitive
damages were dangerous because jurors were "[i]nfluence[d by] caprice,
passion, bias, and prejudice [which are] antithetical to the rule of law.
If there is a fixture of due process, it is that a verdict based on such
influences cannot stand." 27  Justice Breyer, in his concurrence (joined
by Justice O'Connor) in BMW v. Gore, explicitly criticized Alabama
courts for failing to prevent "outcomes so arbitrary that they become
difficult to square with the Constitution's assurance, to every citizen, of
the law's protection. "12s  Similar critiques are frequently made by
judges,'29  politicians, 130 editorialists, 31  scholars, 3 2  and foreign
nationals. "'
A formalist rule of law requires the application of "general principles
relentlessly-regardless of the underlying policies or the consequences of these policies
in specific cases." Id. at 499. That is, formalists are unwilling to analyze or question
the value judgments underlying the "neutral" principles of the law.
The relationship between formalist rule-of-law critiques, which delegitimized
criminal jury nullification, and the paternalist critique of punitive damage awards based
on jury's rejection of efficiency, is complex and somewhat beyond the scope of this
Article.
127. 509 U.S. at 475-76 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
128. 517 U.S. at 596 (Breyer, J., concurring).
129. Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 677-78 (7th Cir.
2003) (analyzing the relationship between rule of law and punitive award); Lane v.
Hughes Aircraft Co., 993 P.2d 388, 399 (Cal. 2000) (Brown, J., concurring in
judgment) (citing laboratory results on juror behavior in concluding that arbitrary awards
offend rule-of-law values).
130. CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP.
DICK ARMEY AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION 154 (Ed Gillespie &
Bob Schellhas eds., 1994) (writing that arbitrary punitive damage awards undermine the
rule of law by "distributing awards in a random and capricious manner").
131. Theodore B. Olson, Rule of Law: The Dangerous National Sport of
Punitive Damages, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 1994, at A17.
132. Sunstein et al., Assessing, supra note 7, at 2110 (describing a primary
argument against punitive damages that their arbitrary award conflicts with the rule of
law); see also SUNSTEIN ET AL., How JURIES DECIDE, supra note 7, at 2 (stating that
substantial variability in punitive damages verdicts is inconsistent with our commitment
to the "rule of law"); Kenneth S. Abraham & John C. Jeffries, Jr., Punitive Damages
and the Rule of Law: The Role of Defendant's Wealth, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 415, 424
(1989) (describing the concern that considering a defendant's wealth in awarding
damages "validates an extralegal approach ...and in doing so offends the values of
fairness and regularity conventionally captured by the phrase 'the rule of law."');
Cooter, supra note 60, at 1144-45 ("Court practice [of awarding punitive damages] is
currently lawless in the sense that predicting punitive damages, even within a wide
margin of error, is impossible in particular cases from knowledge of the law and a
description of the facts."); Theodore B. Olson & Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., The
Supreme Court's Developing Punitive Damages Jurisprudence, 1994 PUB. INT. L. REV.
17, 18 (1994) ("The judiciary has, throughout our Nation's history, vigorously criticized
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Judges and scholars articulate a worry that if punitive awards are
insufficiently rational and consistent, they cannot offer the predictability
required by the rule of law. More subtly, such elites believe that a legal
system defined by economic rationality may become unpredictable if
administered by citizens."
As with jury nullification, the relationship between punitive
damages and any real undermining of the rule of law is subjective.'
Critics have argued that punitive damages are arbitrary or law-
undermining, but there is no consensus that such critiques are correct.
In the background of these underdeveloped and intuitive criticisms
about jury arbitrariness and the rule of law is a more substantive and
powerful attack based on the behavioralist, efficiency argument we
discussed earlier. This argument maintains that juries should be
prevented from granting awards that contradict certain conceptions of
economic efficiency. The critique invokes the same words used to
attack jury nullification as outside the rule of law. Punitive awards are
characterized as "irrational," "ad hoc," "arbitrary," or even "lawless."
Such a critique has much in common with the rule-of-law critique
employed against jury nullification. The stated underlying motivation
for both criticisms is a quest for order. This anti-arbitrariness theme, in
the form of the rule-of-law critique, outcast jury nullification to the
fringes of legal procedure and has helped prevent its return to the
mainstream. Punitive damages are similarly characterized as arbitrary.
The economic critique of behavioralists is that verdicts that contravene
certain notions of efficiency can be viewed as arbitrary, even where they
are systemic and predictable. The new link between stated anti-
arbitrariness concerns and punitive damages has enabled surprisingly
vehement and radical paternalistic reforms, such as the proposed
the doctrine of punitive damages as inconsistent with the rule of law." (internal
quotations omitted)). But cf. Hoffman, supra note 14, at 522 ("When the authors argue
that jury inconsistency undermines the Rule of Law, they are implicitly describing their
own political vision of what the legal system should look like, not what it is." (footnote
omitted)).
133. William B. Ewald, What's So Special About American Law?, 26 OKLA.
CiTY U. L. REV. 1083, 1096 (2001) (describing the facts of BMW and concluding that
"[iun most of the rest of the world these facts would be viewed as incompatible with the
rule of law and would be strictly illegal.").
134. See, e.g., BMW, 517 U.S. at 592-94 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment)
(noting the possibility that had Alabama imposed constraints on jury behavior based on
economic models advanced by Professors Steven Shavell or Robert Cooter, it would
have "counseled more deferential review by this Court"); Hoffman, supra note 14, at
526-30 (arguing that citizens reactions against cost-benefit decision-making, and not a
concern about arbitrariness, motivate and embolden a rule of law critique on punitive
damages).
135. See Hoffman, supra note 14, at 519, 521 (describing statements that




transferal of power from civil juries to bureaucrats,' 36 and has been
more successful than previous criticisms at reaching the mainstream.
The developing rule-of-law critique of punitive damages thus
contains two prongs. The first-the "arbitrariness" critique-is old and
well seasoned. Jurors, by their failings or by institutional design,
simply cannot award damages in consistent ways. They produce
"unreliable, erratic, and unpredictable" results. 37  Such laboratory
studies do not-and cannot-conclude that jurors today are any more, or
any less, arbitrary than jurors throughout the history of the Republic. 
31
For economists who use laboratory evidence to argue that punitive
damages undermine the rule of law, the rule of law involves a second
prong. This critique relies on the normative assumption that punitive
damages ought to be awarded only when justified by efficiency and a
conclusion that juries cannot, or will not, comply with this rule.
That is, the new link between punitive damages and the rule of law
is intended to have the same consequence that such criticism had for
nullification. Undermining the rule of law in this instance means
refusing to do that which legal economists would require jurors to do.1
39
The proposed solution is removal of jury power to award punitive
damages under any circumstances. 40
D. The Nulificatory Jury
These rule-of-law critiques unify what would otherwise seem to be
different kinds of activities by juries. Such jury practices may result
from societal pressure against unfair laws or legal application. "" They
are popularly seen to help disenfranchised citizens at the expense of
social elites. While difficult to track empirically, they have been
subjected to recurring accusations that they violate the rule of law.
In light of these similarities, we think that both jury activities are
symptomatic of a special kind of moral judgment by jurors, resulting in
a particularly controversial sort of verdict. When juries acquit believing
136. SUNSTEIN ET AL., How JuRIEs DECIDE, supra note 7, at 252 (arguing that
civil juries should be replaced with a "schedule of fines and penalties, overseen by
administrative officials").
137. Id. at 241.
138. Hoffman, supra note 14, at 521-23.
139. An interesting perspective on this process is given by Schroeder, supra
note 78, at 373 ("When the expert speaks, he says 'I identify this as the goal of the law.
You should change your behavior and desires in conformity to this goal."').
140. Of course, we note that not all extracompensatory damages are awarded by
juries (consider treble damages in antitrust and patent cases), and consequently, not all
such awards are subject to the behavioralist attack.
141. Punitive damages came into being as courts perceived insufficient
punishment and deterrence of antisocial behavior. Nullification arose from the
perception that some laws were being unjustly applied.
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a defendant to be guilty and award inefficient damages, they are
expressing moral values inconsistent with those prescribed by legal elites
and are nullifying the law. They are nullificatory juries.
Nullificatory juries are rare beasts. 42 As such, they are typically
defined negatively and criticized indirectly. Stated concerns about
nullificatory juries (the rule of law and efficiency) may mask any other
reasons why the practices are challenged. 4 3  Nullificatory juries are
ancient remnants of a less civilized legal system, and, as such, subject to
almost constant retrenchment over the ensuing centuries. Nullificatory
juries rarely find explicit favor in elite eyes and are sometimes seen as a
necessary evil or even a "[r]elic [t]hat [h]as [o]utlived [i]ts [o]rigins."'44
We put up with nullificatory juries because the alternatives (no civil
damage awards by juries; no criminal juries at all) are too drastic to
contemplate. The nullificatory jury depends upon an individualized
sense of justice applied to the parties before it. A nullificatory jury, in
the criminal context, is well known. A nullificatory jury, in the punitive
damages context, punishes where it should deter, in amounts that
outrage legal and media pundits. In both instances, nullificatory juries
are depicted as "out of control" or "runaway" juries. 145  Nullificatory
juries are portrayed as deviant and their critics are portrayed as the rule
of law's platonic guardians. 14
The critical picture scholars have drawn of nullificatory juries-
even as it did not recognize the connection we have drawn-is
incomplete and therefore misguided. We propose, in the following
Parts, to elevate the nullificatory jury to its proper place in the legal
system and to define it as a protector against agglomerations of power
142. The percentage of juries that nullify obviously depends on a definition of
what nullification means, but there is a popular perception that five to fifteen percent of
criminal verdicts are nullificatory. Joan Biskupic, In Jury Rooms, A Form of Civil
Protest Grows; Activists Registering Disdain for Laws with a 'Not Guilty,' WASH. POST.,
Feb. 8, 1999, at Al (collecting statistics of hung juries as proxy for nullifying juries).
In the civil context, nullification as we define it would be a nullification award that
punishes instead of deterring bad conduct. Such awards by their nature are exceedingly
rare. Scholars estimate that significantly less than ten percent of civil trials end with
punitive verdicts. Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages,
26 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 633-34 (1997) (punitive damages awarded in only six percent
of tort cases with prevailing plaintiffs).
143. Jury nullification may be sought to be curtailed, for example, because of
unstated concerns about letting accused criminals go free, while punitive damages may
be opposed because of a reluctance to redistribute wealth.
144. See Sales & Cole, supra note 26, at 1117.
145. Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L.
REV. 168, 173 (1972) (noting a concern of runaway juries in jury nullification).
146. See generally THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 91-102 (Allan Bloom trans., Basic
Books 2d ed. 1991).
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and a corrector of official misconduct.1 47 In short, we want to redefine
the nullificatory jury from necessary evils to simple necessities. To do
so, we must develop a story explaining why nullificatory juries exist
today.
III. WHY Do JURIES NULLIFY?
Attacks on nullificatory juries based on deviation from the rule of
law lack coherence in part because to date, the reason that juries
substitute their own value judgments for preordained legal economists'
judgments has been undertheorized. This Part examines two common
reasons suggested as causes of advance for jury nullification:
dissatisfaction with a legal rule and the effects of racial injustice.
A. Dissatisfaction with Rule Application
Part of the rule-of-law critique of nullificatory juries is explicitly
premised on the idea that juries are calling "unfairness when they see
it."' 48 In the public eye, nullificatory juries exist whenever the jury
perceives a given legal remedy as unfair to the parties before it. These
judgments are likely to be perceived as arbitrary and random, untethered
to any standards, rules, or guidelines. However, we propose that
nullificatory juries are less arbitrary than this picture would suggest.
We offer a theory of consistent nullification: nullificatory juries react
negatively to utilitarian philosophies.
As discussed above, jurors reject legal rules based on efficiency
rationales, 49  believing that "[u]tilitarianism . . . conflicts
with ... intuitive beliefs about what is morally right." 0 This conflict
147. Cf. Weinstein, supra note 10, at 244 ("When jurors return with a
'nullification' verdict, then, they have not in reality 'nullified' anything: they have done
their job.").
148. Courts and commentators are extremely critical of "I know it when I see
it" arguments. See Paul Gewirtz, On "I Know It When I See It," 105 YALE L. J. 1023,
1025-26 (1996) (noting criticisms of the "I know it when I see it" test).
149 See generally Hoffman & O'Shea, supra note 46, at 394-408. See also
supra notes 84-96 and accompanying text.
150. Jonathan Baron, Heuristics and Biases in Equity Judgments: A Utilitarian
Approach, in PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
109, 111 (Barbara A. Mellers & Jonathan Baron eds., 1993). Jonathan Baron, whose
work provides an important set of data about people's responses to utilitarianism,
believes that part of the problem may lie with people's lack of education about
consequentialist thinking. See JONATHAN BARON, JUDGMENT MISGUIDED: INTUITION AND




arises because people are disinclined to master others-citizens exhibit
an anticoercive "rule of thumb."' 5




concludes that individuals want punitive awards to reflect the "extent of
the wrongdoing and the right degree of moral outrage-not optimal
deterrence."' 53 Such preferences about punitive damages may be related
to a more general moral heuristic shared by jurors: "[do] not knowingly
cause a human death."' 154 Sunstein concludes that these moral heuristics
(especially the do-not-cause-death heuristic) are "quite tenacious."' 55
Elsewhere, he had suggested that tenacious moral heuristics make
continued juror control over damage awards inadvisable.'56  By
removing power to bureaucracies, scholars hypothesize, efficiency
might be rescued from the arbitrariness and obstinacy of civil juries.
Then, as he and others have concluded, "whatever ordinary people
think, the relevant administrators will seek to promote optimal
deterrence. "'"57
Similarly, in the criminal context, nullification today occurs most
visibly in drug prosecutions.'58 Prosecution of individual purchasers of
illegal drugs is largely justified by utilitarian ideals-we prosecute the
offender not to rehabilitate him nor to express mere moral condemnation
but largely to deter others and reduce supply.' 59 Jurors confronted with
such cold-hearted prosecutions may be reacting in much the same way
as jurors confronted by cost-benefit decision-making by corporate
wrongdoers.' 60 In both cases, jurors want to judge the morality of the
151. BARON, JUDGMENT MISGUIDED, supra note 150, at 142.
152. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, MORAL HEURISTICS, (John M. Olin Law & Econ.,
2d Series, Working Paper No. 180, Mar. 2003), available at
http://ssm.com/abstractid=387941 (last visited Jan. 30, 2004).
153. Id. at 11.
154. Id. at 8 (emphasis omitted).
155. Id. Sunstein distinguishes between the cost-benefit moral heuristic, which
he believes "impossible to vindicate ... in principle," id., and the reaction against
deterrence-based instructions, which he thinks may be based on defensible, alternative,
moral theories at least some of the time. See id. at 11-12. Sunstein acknowledges that
"I personally do not believe in [the deterrence formula], at least not as a complete theory
of punishment." Id. at 11.
156. See SUNSTEIN ET AL., How JURIES DECIDE, supra note 7, at 239-41.
157. Sunstein et al., Optimal Deterrence, supra note 7, at 250.
158. See, e.g., CONRAD, EVOLUTION, supra note 10, at 149 ("[J]ury
nullification is relatively common is drug cases. ... ); cf. Butler, supra note 10, at
678-84; Biskupic, supra note 142, at A01 (discussing drug trials).
159. Cf. Jesseca R.F. Grassley, Comment, Federal Cocaine Sentencing Policy
Following the 1995 Cocaine Report: Issues of Fairness and Just Punishment, 21
HAMLINE L. REV. 347, 382-85 (1998) (discussing the deterrence rationale for disparities
in crack and cocaine sentences).
160. See Butler, supra note 10, at 716-19 (arguing that jury nullification is the
product of rejecting utilitarian calculus of deterrence as applied to nonviolent crimes).
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conduct on trial. Both punitive damages and nullification, thus, are a
forum in which citizens "send a message" to elites about the moral
acceptability of certain laws and legal theories. Where the rule would
produce results that are contrary to people's notions of individualized
justice, jurors nullify the rule by returning a not-guilty verdict, or an
"inefficient" punitive award.
It may be that the existence of nullificatory juries is a concrete
expression of citizens' reactions against utilitarian morality. Although
we may be willing to allow utilitarian choices to govern where we can
ignore them,16' we are unable to make such choices ourselves as jurors.
However, this general rule elides the demographic differences that are
said to mark nullificatory verdicts. We explore these differences now.
B. Race
Is there a relationship between a juror's race and the likelihood of a
nullificatory jury verdict? Such a relationship is widely assumed to be
true but is of dubious provenance. If it does exist, it is a sobering
reminder about the cultural and demographic content of the idea of the
rule of law.
It is said that Blacks are more likely than whites to nullify the
criminal law. 162  Similarly, punitive damages are perceived to be
imposed at higher rates by minorities and women. 63  Additionally,
minorities and women have been shown in the laboratory to reject the
control mechanism of the efficiency calculus at higher rates than white
men." However, these real world and laboratory perceptions have
been attacked repeatedly by scholars as, respectively, unfounded 65 and
methodologically flawed. 1
66
161. Hoffman & O'Shea, supra note 46, at 407-08 (discussing the lack of public
outcry over utilitarian balancing in government).
162. Butler bases his statement on his own experience, observation, and
instruction that Black jurors are more likely to nullify the law in criminal cases. See
Butler, supra note 10, at 678-79, 689 & n.67, 699 & n. 115 (discussing the widespread
perception, including specific instructions to prosecutors, regarding tendency of Blacks
to nullify and noting the widespread mistrust of the criminal justice system among
Blacks).
163. Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Race, Poverty, and American Tort
Awards: Evidence from Three Datasets, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 46 (2003) (concluding
that while a one percentage point increase in Black poverty rate increases awards three
to ten percent, a similar increase in white populations results in a decrease of mean
awards); cf. Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Trial Outcomes and
Demographics: Is There a Bronx Effect?, 80 Tnx. L. REv. 1839, 1840-43 (2002)
(summarizing perceptions about minority juries' willingness to award damages).
164. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
165. See Elissa Krauss & Martha Schulman, The Myth of Black Juror
Nullification: Racism Dressed up in Jurisprudential Clothing, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 57, 62-63 (1997); Andrew D. Leipold, The Dangers of Race-Based Jury
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So-called minority-based nullification could instead result from
characteristics such as class, poverty, or education level. Minorities
may nullify, award punitive damages, and reject efficient damages
instructions at the same rates as whites. The entire construct we have
described may be an illusion,' 67 as "we do not have a fund of systematic
social knowledge" about how the legal system works in practice.
68
Factors like cognitive bias and media overreaction could be
systematically distorting statistics about demographic effects on jury
behavior. 69 There is little hard data that minorities behave in ways that
are systematically nullificatory (either "civil nullification" or its punitive
equivalents); nonetheless, the perception is widespread. The question
requires further study.
Assume, for a moment, that such racial gaps exist.'7 ° Why would
minorities and women participate in nullificatory juries at higher rates
than white men? An important factor may be distrust by minorities of
facially neutral rules and of the justice system in general.1 7' In the face
of evidence that the system does produce disparate results for its
minority and majority race participants, minorities may conclude that
however fair certain rules seem, they must be tilted against minority
groups. Thus, verdicts that nullify would be intended to correct racial
Nullification: A Response to Professor Butler, 44 UCLA L. REV. 109, 117 (1996)
(disagreeing with statistics about criminal jury nullification). Eisenberg, studying
punitive awards, concluded that in federal trials, "[i]ncreasing black population
percentages correlate with lower median awards and increasing poverty rates correlate
with higher median awards. For products liability cases, increasing black population
percentages correlate with lower median awards." Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 163,
at 1859-60. "Any directly observable 'little-guy effect' is more a function of income or
urbanization than of race. And the effect is far from universal across case categories or
between state and federal courts." Id. at 1860.
166. See supra note 82 (discussing methodological criticisms of behavioralism).
But see Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 163, at 38 n.16 (discussing methodological
differences between their study and Eisenberg's study).
167. But cf. Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 163, at 53 (stating that "we have
demonstrated that some robust correlations exist between county demographics and tort
awards"). We note that Helland and Tabarrok state that "little attention has been paid to
the role of race and poverty in the American tort system." Id. at 28.
168. See Galanter, supra note 1, at 740.
169. Id. at 743-49.
170. Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 163, at 1853 (arguing that while some
correlations between minority presence and awards exist, the total effects are sufficiently
inconsistent and that much of the demographic folk wisdom may need to be
reconsidered). See generally Galanter, supra note 1 (discussing many myths about the
tort system as ungrounded in reality).
171. See Butler, supra note 10, at 699 (noting a widespread mistrust of the
criminal justice system among Blacks); Bernard A. Williams, Guilty Until Proven
Innocent: The Tragedy of Habeas Capital Appeals, 18 J.L. & POL. 773, 779-82 (2002)
(noting evidence that the death penalty is disproportionately given to people of color);
see also Kaimipono David Wenger, Slavery as a Takings Clause Violation, 53 AM. U.
L. REV. 191 (forthcoming 2004) (summarizing statistics on racial disparities).
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disparities. One commentator has encouraged such racially conscious
activity. "'
Related to this distrust may be a feeling that the individual jury trial
is a place in which minorities can feel empowered to send a signal to
elites.1 3  This message may be entirely independent from minority
distrust of facially neutral rules. Nullification may be (especially in the
punitive context) an opportunity to redistribute wealth when legislatures
have failed to do so in reaction to changes in doctrine that transferred
wealth from poor to rich litigants."
Butler notes that the traditional rule of law has been used as a tool
to oppress minorities. ' He argues that Blacks' disregard for the rule of
law-as expressed through jury nullification-is related to Blacks'
exclusion from the lawmaking process.'76 "[B]lacks are unable to
achieve substantial progress through electoral politics" because other
groups have rejected opportunities to form coalitions with them, which
172. See Butler, supra note 10, at 715-23. But see Leipold, supra note 165, at
113-31 (criticizing Butler's proposal).
173. Butler suggests that nullification can arise from a deep-seated desire not to
send another Black man to prison. Butler, supra note 10, at 679. Butler argues that
nullification stems from distrust of the criminal justice system among Blacks, and that
that distrust is, in turn, a result of the many examples of racism Blacks encounter on a
regular basis. Id. at 699 & n. 115.
174. Scholars have suggested that Black jurors should use their position to assist
the Black community. Butler, supra note 10, at 715-18; see also Frank M. McClellan,
The Dark Side of Tort Reform: Searching for Racial Justice, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 761,
784 (1996) ("The only institutions in America where people of color have the power to
make immediate wealth redistribution decisions are urban governments and juries.").
Given relative Black poverty, redistribution through damages probably favors Blacks
unless it is targeted against them. Eisenberg's study did find a correlation between
poverty rates and median award levels. See Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 163, at 1860
(finding a correlation in some jurisdictions for some causes of action). Helland and
Tabarrok's study concludes that a hypothesis explaining their results of increased
verdicts among minorities is that "different life experiences of poor Black and Hispanic
jury members ... [may have different ideas] about justice and due compensation."
Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 163, at 52; cf. Ellis, Punitive Damages, supra note 64,
at 979 (noting wealth redistribution tendency).
A fundamental premise of many legal economists is that legal rules should be set
independent of their distributive effects, because legislatures could (and perhaps should)
redistribute gains to litigants through the tax and transfer system. Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HART. L. REV. 961, 994 n.65, 995 n.66
(2001). This stance towards distributive effects would tend, of course, to distribute
wealth away from poorer litigants. Unfortunately, as Duncan Kennedy has observed,
"[l]egislatures never, ever pass statutes that adjust tax and transfer programmes to make
up for the modifications of private law rules (though of course they could if they wanted
to)." Duncan Kennedy, Law-and-Economics from the Perspective of Critical Legal
Studies, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 465, 469
(Peter Newman ed., 1998).
175. Butler, supra note 10, at 707.
176. Id. at 706-10.
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leaves them in a permanent political minority status.' Drawing on the
work of Lani Guinier and Owen Fiss, Butler argues that as "racism
excludes blacks from the governing legislative coalitions .... [a]
permanent, homogenous majority emerges, which effectively
marginalizes minority interests and transform[s] majority rule into
majority tyranny."' Nullification can be seen as a reaction to this
exclusion.
A demographic connection to nullificatory juries would call into
doubt scholarship that ignores the racial and gender effects of proposed
reforms. More affluent white male scholars, seeking to take power
away from jurors more likely to be poor, or women, or racial
minorities, might be reasonably expected to bear a special burden of
persuasion. Under this fact pattern, scholars could no longer simply
assume that the jury system is so broken that any change-even changes
unsupported by empirical evidence-is desirable. The background
assumption would be instead that the system creates some degree of
justice for disenfranchised groups, and that deviations from that ideal
are presumptively undesireable.
C. Other Factors
Both nullification and punitive damages also rely on jury sympathy.
Nullification occurs where a jury sympathizes with a defendant; 79
punitive damages are awarded in cases where a jury sympathizes with a
plaintiff.'" This sympathy may be tempered, as some scholars have
suggested, by a weighing of opportunity costs.'' Another factor is the
presence of extreme or outrageous behavior. Jury nullification is often
the result of extreme prosecutorial overreaching.' 82 Punitive damages
are generally tied to findings of egregious behavior.' 3
177. Id. at 710.
178. Id. at 711 (internal quotations omitted).
179. Id. at 689. As we have noted previously, under another definition of
nullification, sympathy for the victim could engender nullificatory verdicts as well.
180. This sympathy can result in a desire to give a windfall or to punish the
party who harmed the plaintiff.
181. Butler believes that nullification is not irrational, as opponents argue, but is
the product of jurors weighing opportunity costs. Butler, supra note 10, at 698.
Similarly, imposition of punitive damages is a rational decision where opportunity
costs-less deterrence, less respect for law-are too high.
182. See Brown, supra note 10, at 1172-78.




We would like to arrive at a definite conclusion as to the causes of
nullificatory juries. We cannot. There is widespread consensus that the
nullificatory jury is tied to dissatisfaction with utilitarian rule
application. Although many have argued that race and gender play an
important role in nullification, the empirical evidence supporting such
intuitions is weak. Other potential factors are even less dispositive.
We also realize that some of the generative forces creating large
punitive awards may differ from those leading to nullification. That is,
there are times when a large punitive award will be-as critics charge-a
relatively random event, unconnected to any of the larger anti-utilitarian
themes we have explored. But generally, we hypothesize that
nullificatory juries exist when commonsense intuitions about morality
come into conflict with utilitarian legal judgments. We acknowledge
that this conclusion is almost certainly incomplete.
IV. REACTIONS TO THE NULLIFICATORY JURY
This Part discusses some of the practical proposals that scholars and
judges have advanced in constraining nullificatory juries. These
reactions appear to be related to a perception that in certain incarnations,
punitive damages and jury nullification flout the rule of law and must be
constrained or eliminated as a consequence.
Commentators agree that jury nullification occurs only in rare
cases. 184  Yet, both critics and advocates agree that the effect of
nullification is greater than the few cases of actual nullification verdicts.
Nullification advocates argue that the threat of nullification helps deter
official misconduct by altering prosecutorial and judicial incentives,
185
while critics argue that nullification skews legal incentives in a harmful
way. 86 Similarly, punitive damages apply only in a limited number of
cases, 87 but the threat of punitive damages may serve to deter
prospective defendants from engaging in egregious behavior of the sort
likely to give rise to a punitive award. 
88
Because even their proponents generally feel that both nullification
and punitive damages ought to be happening in only a small percentage
184. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 10, at 1177-78; Leipold, supra note 10, at
260-63; see also Brown, supra note 10, at 1151 n.8 (noting the difficulty of determining
when nullification occurs).
185. See Brown, supra note 10, at 1176-78.
186. See Leipold, supra note 10, at 260-63.
187. See generally Eisenberg et al., supra note 142.
188. The point is self-evident. Scholars have argued the indeterminate awards
can create the risk of overdeterrence. See Ellis, supra note 20, at 46-52.
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of cases"g-one case suggests that nullification is healthful as
"occasional medicine" t-both are kept in check by elaborate systems
of safeguards, which are now increasing in power and scope.
A. Informational Safeguards
Both nullification and punitive damage awards are first constrained
by informational safeguards. In both cases, juries are almost always
kept in the dark about their power. In the case of jury nullification, the
informational shield is black-letter law: jurors may hand down
nullification verdicts but may not be told that they have the power to do
so. '9 Jurors may even be excluded for stating that they believe that they
have the power to nullify.' This state of affairs seems to reflect an
uneasy compromise about the value of nullification.'93 In this way,
informational safeguards, like the rules of evidence, create a moral and
political regime that enables public acceptance of jury verdicts. 94
Citizens are reassured that guilty and not guilty verdicts are fair because
the juries know just enough about their power to save the law from its
rigidity.
Similarly, civil juries are rarely made aware of their ability to
award extracompensatory damages. The majority of states proscribe all
punitive damages,'95 and even when those damages are available, they
exist only when a wrongdoer has committed "[s]omething more than the
mere commission of a tort" or breach of contract.' Second, many
states provide for a bifurcated procedure, only considering punitive
189. Even the authors of Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide concede that a
more moderate alternative would preserve the possibility of "a very high punitive
award" imposed by judges, or awarded by juries constrained by comparison with others.
SUNSTEIN Ex AL., How JURIES DECIDE, supra note 7, at 249.
190. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
("What makes for health as an occasional medicine would be disastrous as a daily
diet.").
191. Brown, supra note 10, at 1199.
192. See, e.g., Thomas, 116 F.3d at 614-25.
193. Brown, supra note 10, at 1197-1200.
194. Cf. Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the
Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1368-77 (1985) (describing
procedural mechanisms, including informational safeguards like the rules of evidence,
that make verdicts publicly acceptable).
195. Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability:
Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1, 10 n.31 (1992).
196. Robert F. Blomquist, Rethinking the Citizen as Prosecutor Model of
Environmental Enforcement Under the Clean Water Act: Some Overlooked Problems of




awards after specific findings of liability. 97 Under such systems, many
juries are never told of their ability to award punitive damages because
they do not make the findings of fact and liability required for an
instruction on punitive damages at the damages phase of the trial. This
veil of ignorance no doubt reduces the frequency of extracompensatory
awards, even as it increases system-wide legitimacy.
B. Postverdict Safeguards
Punitive damages are subject to an extra constraint: 1' postverdict
judicial control. As an initial matter, the trial judge may reduce
damages through remittitur.' 99 This ability provides an "error-correcting
device" that reduces the scope of the nullificatory jury's power.2"
Additionally, in most jurisdictions, punitive damages can be reduced on
appeal (one scholar has estimated that one-third of awards in some
jurisdictions are reduced or reversed on appeal)2' but cannot be
increased.2 2 Supreme Court decisions have put an effective cap on
damage awards at a single-digit multiplier of compensatory damages.2"3
These protections "protect rule of law values in evenhandedness and
predictability, as well as the division of legal labor value in democratic
control. "204
Some have hypothesized that postverdict controls are absent in the
criminal context because nullification effectively represents the jury's
197. SUNSTEIN ET AL., How JURIES DECIDE, supra note 7, at 10; cf. Jack B.
Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation of Jury Negligence Trial: An Example of the
Questionable Use of Rule Making Power, 14 VAND. L. REV. 831, 831 (1961).
198. A structural control on jury nullification that in turn is not present in the
punitive context is that jurors are community members who may be adversely affected
by improperly applied nullification. Brown, supra note 10, at 1178 (arguing that jurors
will be "appropriately cautious" with nullification for this reason). Another constraint
cited in support of jury nullification is that it is only a corollary to prosecutorial
discretion. Id. at 1188-91 & n.158.
199. See Snyder, supra note 1, at 307-16 (discussing remittitur).
200. Leipold, supra note 10, at 260-67 (internal quotations omitted) (criticizing
jury, nullification in criminal context because of lack of error-correcting devices).
201. Rustad, supra note 195, at 54-55 (1992); see also Neil Vidmar, The
Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REV.
849, 893-95 (1998) (collecting studies about proportions of damages actually paid and
suggesting that jurisdictions with higher punitive awards have higher rates of remittitur);
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, New Light on Punitive Damages,
REGULATION, Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 33, 35-36 (indicating that two percent of punitive
awards are upheld in state courts).
202. That is, addittur is not available in many jurisdictions, including the federal
courts. SUNSTEIN ET AL., How JURIES DECIDE, supra note 7, at 251.
203. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (noting language in the Supreme
Court's State Farm decision).
204. Blomquist, supra note 196, at 380.
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verdict that the process itself is flawed."0 5 In such circumstances,
postverdict controls would remove an important check on the judiciary
(in effect, allowing it to be the sole judge of its own conduct).
However, this distinction does not fully justify postverdict controls over
civil juries, who, we theorize, are also serving as a check on the power
of legal elites to set the moral goals of the civil law.
C. Additional Proposals
For certain scholars, such preverdict and postverdict safeguards are
plainly insufficient. More radical solutions have been offered. Of those
many proposals, we offer a few examples.
First, some scholars have argued for increased trial court control
over punitive awards. These controls would range from higher
standards of proof in awarding damages206 to more explicit jury
instructions" to greater power in the trial judge to overturn awards.2"'
Second, scholars have suggested that appellate courts ought to
exercise their review powers with a firmer hand. For example, scholars
have proposed allowing appellate courts to reverse jury nullification
verdicts and mandate new trials. 09  In the civil context, such courts
could compare a given punitive verdict against others in deciding
whether it comports with due process. 2'0 This constraint was rejected by
the Supreme Court as a matter of constitutional law2 1I but remains
available legislatively. Alternatively, in a proposal that the Supreme
Court has accepted, appellate courts could review punitive awards de
novo.
212
Scholars have advocated (and politicians have in some jurisdictions
implemented) caps on the amount of punitive damages that may be
awarded.213 Finally, and most radically, scholars have argued that juries
205. See Brown, supra note 10, at 1191-97.
206. Sales & Cole, supra note 26, at 1166-67 (asserting that "beyond a
reasonable doubt" or "clear and convincing" standard should be applied).
207. See, e.g., Colby, supra note 32, at 661 (asserting that some commentators
have proposed stronger jury instructions as a solution for multiple punishment problem);
Polinsky and Shavell, supra note 43, at 957-62.
208. Sales & Cole, supra note 26, at 1150-55.
209. See Leipold, supra note 10, at 317-20 (asserting that appellate courts
should be able to reverse criminal jury nullification).
210. See SUNSTEIN Er AL., How JURIES DECIDE, supra note 7, at 249.
211. TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 457.
212. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 431-
32 (2001) (requiring de novo review)
213. See Gregory Nathan Hoole, Note, In the Wake of Seemingly Exorbitant
Punitive Damage Awards America Demands Caps on Punitive Damages-Are We




ought not have the power to award punitive damages at all, and instead,
trial judges214 or administrative tribunals should be given the sole
authority to punish civil wrongdoing.215 This is similar to arguments
that criminal juries ought not be able to nullify the law at all.216
This Part has discussed the limitations on nullificatory juries. These
limitations show a determination in the legal system to control these
phenomena. At the same time, the nullificatory jury's resilience in the
face of these criticisms (in the form of evidence that nullificatory juries
still exist) shows that jurors may see their own role as valuable. In the
next Part, we discuss why this may be so.
V. THE VALUE OF NULLIFICATORY JURIES
Nullificatory juries occupy a precarious place in legal scholarship
and practice. They are, at best, tolerated. Some of the brightest legal
minds in the academy, large corporations, law enforcement, judges, and
increasingly, the public at large describe such juries as arbitrary and
irrational. Left unchecked, nullificatory juries can harm legitimate
companies and erode our ideals of due process. We agree with most
critics that nullificatory juries must continue to be the exception, not the
rule.
But we disagree that a proper remedy is to transfer control of
punitive awards to bureaucrats. 217  "[L]aw application is inevitably a
broadly interpretive task" shared by citizens, judges, and scholars
alike.2' Citizens must be involved in interpreting the law if they are to
be able to internalize its norms and obey it.
Section A discusses the role of nullificatory juries within the rule of
law. Building on work done by other scholars, we discuss both the
protective functions, the equitable functions, and the participatory
functions of nullificatory juries. Section B considers some of the
pernicious effects of arguing against nullificatory juries by invoking a
more limited conception of the rule of law. We also propose a series of
empirical tests that would help scholars to decide whether further
214. See, e.g., Litwiller, supra note 18, at 467-71 (articulating a "modest
proposal").
215. As an administrative matter, punitive awards could be replaced by a
"schedule of fines and penalties, overseen by administrative officials." SUNSTEIN ET
AL., How JURIES DECIDE, supra note 7, at 252.
216. Leipold, supra note 10, at 296-311; cf. Simson, supra note 119, at 512-
16.
217. We are in accord with Judge Weinstein, who wrote: "The law must be
careful not to overreact to problems with punitive damages ... by instituting a
counterproductive overly Procrustean regime." In re Simon II Litigation, 211 F.R.D.
86, 106-07 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).




controls on nullificatory juries are necessary or desirable, and a
"moratorium" on certain types of jury critiques, pending the emergence
of further empirical results.
A. Nullificatory Juries Within the Rule of Law
When is the nullificatory jury acting within the rule of law? The
question has been explored by scholars in the criminal context2 9 but
unexplored in the civil context.
We suggest that there are three related functions that the
nullificatory jury fulfills within the rule of law. The first is a protective
function: the nullificatory jury prevents oppression from occurring in a
particular case. The second is an equitable function: nullificatory juries
provide needed flexibility within the legal system to prevent injustice.
The final role is a participatory function: the nullificatory jury engages
in a dialogue with lawmakers over the justness or prudence of a law or
its application.
1. THE PROTECTIVE FUNCTION OF NULLIFICATORY JURIES
Scholars have long been aware that nullificatory juries serve a
protective function, ensuring that powerful legal actors comply with the
law. For example, Darryl Brown argues that jury nullification is
appropriate within the rule of law when "public officials violate
important laws" during the investigation or indictment process.22 When
juries act to remedy such official misconduct by refusing to convict
defendants, they are exercising the protective function of the
nullificatory jury. This function is recognized by courts as well; the
Supreme Court has stated that "[a] right to jury trial is granted to
criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the
Government. "22'
In the criminal context, such corrections are obvious: nullification
acts to soften prosecutorial discretion, serving as the last line of defense
against official tyranny.222 The rule of law is served in this circumstance
because the rule of law is offended as much by official discretion as jury
discretion. Nullification by a jury, in effect, cancels out nullification by
a prosecutor.
219. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 10, at 1150; see also id. at 1153 n.18
(arguing for the idea of nullification within the rule of law).
220. Brown, supra note 10, at 1172.
221. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968).




The protective function is less present in civil nullification because
most cases are not brought with the aid of government officials.
However, if punitive damages were to be awarded in many cases where
the government had failed to prosecute criminal conduct (because of the
capturing of public agencies by corporations, or simply discretion), then
punitive damages could be seen to serve the same rule-of-law values as
nullification. There is some evidence that punitive damages are
increasingly playing just this role.223
The protective function has a related deterrent role. Potential
intervention by a nullificatory jury exercising its protective function is
an incentive for the government to only bring proper criminal
prosecution. Similarly, the uncertainty of relatively unconstrained
punitive damage awards gives the punitive jury greater power to deter
wrongdoing. The threat of punitive damages hangs like a sword of
Damocles, deterring harmful acts by its terrible unpredictability just as
the threat of jury nullification hangs in criminal trials, deterring
overzealous and misguided prosecution.2"
The protective function of jury nullification is not lightly invoked.
Brown suggests that it is appropriate only in compelling cases.225 As we
live in a democratic society, the presumption should be that our public
officials will protect us from wrongdoers. Juries, if instructed in their
protective role explicitly, would be in effect instructed that their
government was wont to fail them. Such cynicism is inappropriate in
the run-of-the-mill tort case. However, the protective function is
important in exceptional cases.
It is difficult to conceive of rule-of-law objections to the exercise by
a nullificatory jury of its protective function. Such exercises are
practically by definition only necessary where the rule of law has failed
elsewhere. This function is also limited and has no conceivable
precedential value.
223. See Thomas Koenig & Michael Runstad, "Crimtorts" as Corporate Just
Desserts, 31 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 289 (1998) (noting that punitive damages are
increasingly appropriate to remedy conduct that has not been prosecuted); see also
Mathias, 347 F.3d at 676-77 (analyzing the relationship between potential regulatory
action and a large punitive award for the failure of the hotel to prevent insect
infestation).
224. But cf. JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION
35 (1995) (suggesting that punitive damages could be entirely eliminated if replaced by
stringent government regulations).
225. See Brown, supra note 10, at 1200; cf. Butler, supra note 10, at 708-09
(asserting that there is no moral obligation to follow an unjust law).
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2. EQUITABLE FUNCTION OF NULLIFICATORY JURIES
Nullificatory juries serve an equitable function, ensuring that just
laws are fairly applied to particular individuals. It is probably this
function that jury nullification advocates hail when they praise Roscoe
Pound's characterization of nullification as "the great corrective of law
in its actual administration., 226  Legal philosopher Kent Greenawalt
alludes to a similar purpose, writing that nullification might be required
by "the ends of justice" even though it means disregarding law.227 Quite
obviously, the psychological rationale for equitable nullification is linked
to the anti-utilitarian preferences we described in Part III. Where juries
believe that laws are being applied in rigid, inflexible, utilitarian ways,
they may react in revulsion and assert their more ordinary
understandings of fairness and justice in refusing to comply with the
law's requirements.
When jurors nullify a mandatory minimum drug sentence because
they feel that the result would be injustice in that case-even though the
prosecution has not overreached and the law may be just in many other
cases-they are exercising the equitable function.
Jury nullification advocates have argued that nullification is a
doctrine that, like equity, adds required flexibility.228 Nullification can
counteract the rigidity of the law. 229 Even though a just legal rule may
be applied by righteous prosecutors, the result may be nevertheless
unjust. Equity achieves justice in the individual case. 23" Early in the
226. Pound, supra note 111, at 18. To be fair, Pound also labeled the practice
"jury lawlessness." Id.; see also Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1135 (discussing Pound's
statement).
227. KENT GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 360-66 (1987).
Other commentators also discuss this view of nullification. See Brown, supra note 10,
at 1152 & n.14; Butler, supra note 10, at 723 (arguing that nullifying jurors "serve a
higher calling than law: justice").
228. For a discussion of the added flexibility available in equity, see generally
Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort Law, 1991
U. ILL. L. REV. 269 (1991). As Weinstein & Hershonev point out, equity provides a
system of more flexible procedures. Id. at 278-81. The adoption of these flexible
procedures under codified systems such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
represents "the conquest of law by equity." Id. at 279. This conquest was made
possible by society's affirmative decision to embrace the flexible procedures of equity.
Id.; see also Jack B. Weinstein, The Ghost of Process Past: The Fiftieth Anniversary of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 6 (1988).
229. See Brown, supra note 10, at 1149 n. 1; Anne Bowen Poulin, The Jury: The
Criminal Justice System's Different Voice, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1377, 1400 (1994) ("The
jury's power to nullify provides an accommodation between the rigidity of the law and
the need to hear and respond to positions that do not fit legal pigeonholes .... ").
230. "Like equity, nullification is one way ... to correct the imperfections of
the rule of law and, when wisely used, to achieve justice in an individual case that rule
application would not achieve." Brown, supra note 10, at 1153; see also John Clark,
The Social Psychology of Jury Nullification, 24 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 39, 56 (2000);
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twentieth century, Wigmore wrote that nullification resulted in
amelioration of "the odium of inflexible rules of the law."2"' In the
criminal context, equity is traditionally manifested through the doctrine
of lenity, which is related to jury nullification.232
In its equitable role, the nullificatory jury affects more than the case
at hand. Because the nullificatory jury's decision is independent of
wrongdoing by officials, it serves as a possible basis for future decisions
by a judge or another jury. It adds to the tome of "tradition" or
"custom" that may influence future cases. In its equitable role, the
nullificatory jury communicates with the judicial system and suggests
that equity may be merited in certain instances. The precedential value
of such judgments is never certain but could potentially be significant.
There are more obvious potential rule-of-law problems for the
nullificatory jury exercising its equitable role. Versions of the rule of
law requiring that rules be applied mechanically conflict with equity.
2 33
However, equity scholars note that it is equity's flexibility that makes it
vital for a system of law. 2 4 This argument is similar to those raised by
jury nullification advocates, especially Brown, who contend that
nullification is a necessary element in the rule of law.235
Stephen R. Mysliwiec, Note, Toward Principles of Jury Equity, 83 YALE L.J. 1023,
1048-54 (1974) (discussing equitable notions applied by juries); Michael R. Smythers,
Equitable Acquittals: Prediction and Preparation Prevent Post-Panel Predicaments,
ARMY LAW., Apr. 1986, at 3; cf. Lawrence W. Crispo et al., Jury Nullification: Law
Versus Anarchy, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1, 3 (1997) (critiquing nullification but noting
that nullification proponents "claim that [nullification] tempers law with justice and
brings the common sense of the average citizen and the 'community conscience' to bear
on individual cases, supplying needed flexibility and equity to the law." (footnote
omitted)).
231. John H. Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of Jury Trial, 12 J. AM.
JUDICATURE SOC'Y 166, 170 (1928-1929).
232. Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1130 n.33 (discussing nullification as part of the
jury's "prerogative of lenity and equity").
233. As Weinstein & Hershenov note:
Balancing the various equities in mass tort litigation inevitably will lead to
conflict between the rule of law-by which we mean the "formal and
procedural correctness of the means used to reach substantive results"-and
justice-by which we mean the intuitive correctness of the substantive end
result of the legal system. This conflict is not new. John Locke warned that
sometimes "a strict and rigid observation of the laws may do harm." Much
of equity jurisprudence, of course, has developed out of this tension between
predictability based on rigid rules of the past and flexibility based on present
needs of a changing society.
Weinstein & Hershonev, supra note 228, at 277 (footnotes omitted).
234. Id. at 277-79.
235. See Brown, supra note 10, at 1200.
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3. PARTICIPATORY FUNCTION OF NULLIFICATORY JURIES
Finally, nullificatory juries serve a participatory function. At its
most basic, this role involves gap-filling-rendering sensible verdicts
that remove problems created by inadvertent drafting problems or by
captured or incompetent legislatures. The nullificatory jury can serve as
a check on excesses of the legislative process .236 Nullification may be
more effective at gap-filling than electoral politics because of collective
action problems.237
In a more complicated exercise of the participatory function,
nullificatory juries aid in the maintenance of the rule of law by signaling
to the legislative and executive branches when the law has moved too far
from community norms. 23' They may thus signal to the legislature that a
particular law is unjust or has a harmful effect.239
This kind of feedback is invaluable in the criminal context. For
example, juries regularly nullified fugitive slave laws, which they found
repugnant.' More recently, nullification is said to have impacted cases
involving controversial laws on drugs, abortion, the draft, and police
brutality.2" Nullification in this context is a reminder that the state's
criminal enforcement power must be used with caution. Courts have in
other contexts recognized the value of the participatory role of juries in
law 242
236. Brown suggests that in some instances jury nullification is necessary
because "[t]he rule of law . . . has been breached [by the state] long before the jury's
verdict." Id. at 1173. Similar considerations would apply to a law passed by a
legislature which has been captured by interests which want to see compensatory
damages reduced. See also id. at 1186 ("The laws produced by a flawed democratic
process have a weak claim to legitimacy . . .
237. Id. at 1190 & n. 162.
238. See id. at 1200; Magliocca, supra note 18, at 186-87; Marder, supra note
96, at 926-34; Noah, supra note 10, at 1623-24 (noting this argument); Scheflin & Van
Dyke, supra note 11, at 71. Alternatively, this function of jury nullification could be
viewed as a dialogue between the legislature and the laity. See Brown, supra note 10, at
1186-87.
239. This may also occur where the law is just, and has a beneficial effect, but
the citizens are infected by bias or prejudice, and cannot see it.
240. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing nullification of
fugitive slave laws).
241. See, e.g., CONRAD, EVOLUTION, supra note 10, at 143-49; Scheflin, supra
note 145, at 199-201; Alan W. Scheflin & Jon M. Van Dyke, Merciful Juries: The
Resilience of Jury Nullification, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 165, 169 (1991).
242. For example, the participatory role of juries is explicitly acknowledged as a
rationale for the use of advisory juries. See, e.g., NAACP v. Acusport Corp., 226 F.
Supp. 2d 391, 398 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). The court stated that:
Advisory juries are particularly useful in cases in which 'there are special
factors ... which suggest that a jury composed of members of the
community would provide the Court valuable guidance in making its own
findings and conclusions.' . . . Because advisory juries permit community
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Nullificatory juries awarding punitive damages serve a similar
signaling role. While a consistent pattern of jury nullification can be a
signal to the legislature that a law is unjust or is being unjustly applied,
a consistent pattern of punitive damage awards should be viewed as a
signal that traditional compensatory damages are insufficient to satisfy
the punitive aspect of law. In this way, punitive awards act like class
actions in remedying accretions of corporate power by empowering
citizens. 243
Given this signaling component of punitive damage awards, it is
particularly ironic that one political response to them has been to impose
caps.' This silencing of the signaling device is wrongheaded; a more
appropriate response to such a persistent signal is to investigate its root
causes.
245
If the legislature is unwilling to modify legal rules to respond to the
concerns signaled by the awarding of punitive damages, then such
awards serve a separate signaling purpose-they can signal to the public
that the legislature is unwilling to perform its duties. They may thus be
evidence of legislative capture by interest groups.246
Nullificatory juries permit citizens to have a more direct role in
policymaking than normally allowed in our representative government.
For example, legislation against tobacco was politically unpalatable until
a series of large punitive awards rendered the industry amenable to
certain reforms.247 Similarly, although the FDA and like agencies make
participation and may incorporate the public's views of morality and
changing common law, their use is particularly appropriate in cases
involving community-based standards.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
243. Of course, both punitive awards and class actions are vulnerable to a
similar rebuttal: they provide inefficient populist mechanisms and end up diverting a
great deal of wealth to lawyers instead of citizens.
244. See supra note 213.
245. The clustering of punitive damage awards against certain defendants whose
behavior may be viewed as egregious-tobacco product manufacturers, for example-is
a signal from jurors in their participatory role that the tort system does not adequately
deter such behavior and that it should be deterred. A proper response to this signal
might be to modify the nonpunitive aspects of the tort system to reflect this judgment. It
is possible that legislative modifications to the tort system would be blocked by due
process or other constitutional constraints, in which case retaining the punitive damage
system might be the only way to ensure that the law fulfilled its punitive and deterrent
functions.
246. See generally Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation
Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223,
223 (1986) (discussing legislative capture); Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and
the Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional
Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471, 474 (1988).
247. Laura Nader, The Life of the Law-A Moving Story, 36 VAL. U. L. REV.
655, 668 (2002); Megan E. Gorman, Note, Going Up in Smoke: The Effect of Philip
Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger & Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly on the Takings of
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it all but impossible for ordinary citizens to gain a direct role in the
process of regulation, punitive awards against corporations for their
products give nullificatory juries a regulatory role.
In the exercise of its participatory role, nullificatory juries are said
to give rules that are "less legalistic and more infused with localized, lay
notions of justice. "" Such localized ideas may be important in the
criminal context, imparting community values on law enforcement. 49
Evidence for this role is particularly strong in the civil context, as there
is evidence from laboratory studies that juries award higher punitive
damage awards in favor of local victims and against foreign
tortfeasors.2 zS Such awards may be normatively objectionable, but they
do infuse community norms into the legal process thus adding localized
legitimacy."
Finally, the nullificatory jury provides a way for minority groups,
which are likely to be adversely affected by majority use of the
democratic process, to actively participate in lawmaking.252 Through
nullificatory juries, for example, Blacks may be able to contest laws that
they have been prevented from contesting in the legislature because of
the flaws in the democratic process.
The participatory function of the nullificatory jury is
understandably subject to rule-of-law critiques. Critics decry the "ad
hoc" nature of unelected jurors engaging in political decision-making.253
We acknowledge the strength of such critiques, which certainly highlight
the potential problems in granting nullificatory juries too strong a
participatory power.
Scholars criticize jury nullification as being a bad influence-a
negative signaling function-towards the legislative process. This
argument is that nullification acts as a safety valve and that the absence
of harsh sentences can allow a legislature to postpone or avoid making
necessary changes to the law.2" While not a rule-of-law critique per se,
this critique is grounded in many of the same concerns. A jury's "ad
intellectual Property, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 771, 782-86 (2002) (discussing connection
between lawsuits and government reform efforts). Juries in the tobacco cases might
have bankrupted an industry that provided thousands of jobs to American workers while
providing a legal product consumed by millions of citizens. But with oversight, the
juries provided an important role as a signaler of popular discontent with the status quo,
beginning a more realistic dialogue between the cigarette industry and government.
248. See Brown, supra note 10, at 1198.
249. See id.
250. SUNSTEIN ET AL., How JURIES DECIDE, supra note 7, at 62.
251. See Sharkey, supra note 82, at 410-11 (discussing theorized regional
differences between juror verdicts).
252. Butler, supra note 10, at 709.
253. See, e.g., Leipold, supra note 10, at 299-301; Simson, supra note 119, at
512-13.
254. Leipold, supra note 10, at 300-01.
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hoc repeal of the law via nullification is not an unqualified good,
because it rescues one person from unjust conviction at the expense of
increasing the probability that the law will remain on the books to prove
a source of oppression for others." 2"
However, we feel that such critiques undervalue the participatory
role of the nullificatory jury. As noted above, the nullificatory jury is
the source of substantial benefit through its participatory role. Such
benefits contribute to the welfare of society.
In addition, we are unconvinced by characterizations of the
participatory role of nullificatory juries as counter to the American legal
and political system. Indeed, jury participation helps enhance the
democratic legitimacy of the law. Separating juries from the citizenry
runs counter to American tradition, in which juries are "regarded as one
form of the sovereignty of the people .... The jury is the part of the
nation responsible for the execution of the laws."25 6  Under this
tradition, the nullificatory jury may properly exercise its participatory
function within the rule of law. 57
255. Simson, supra note 119, at 514-15. Simson further argues that "[b]y
eliminating some of the injustices that would result from the enforcement of an
unpopular law, jury nullification works to foster the illusion that, regardless of the law
on the books, justice is basically being done." Id. at 514.
Of course, there is some merit to this position. The existence of unwise laws on
the books-even where they are unenforced-can have adverse consequences. See
Christopher R. Leslie, Standing in the Way of Equality: How States Use Standing
Doctrine to Insulate Sodomy Laws from Constitutional Attack, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 29
(discussing adverse secondary effects of unenforced laws, specifically sodomy).
256. CONRAD, EVOLUTION, supra note 10, at 302 n.5 (citing ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 273 (1969 ed.) (1835) ("The jury is the part of
the nation responsible for the execution of the laws ....")); see also Scheflin & Van
Dyke, supra note 11, at 68. Nullification opponents, recognizing that such arguments
are offered, typically dismiss them as unconvincing. St, John, supra note 119, at 2578-
81.
257. It is especially vital to maintain the participatory function given that jury
power is being eroded in many areas. Commentators have noted the increasing tendency
to move tort law subjects into the realms of criminal or administrative law. Jack B.
Weinstein, Compensation for Mass Private Delicts: Evolving Roles of Administrative,
Criminal & Tort Law, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 949, 966-68. When enforcement is
done through sentencing or administrative agency, jury power is trumped. Among the
other ways courts have begun to cut down jury power in favor of defendants is through
increases in the court's ability to grant summary judgment, increased use of Daubert and
other evidentiary rules, and an increased tendency to reverse cases where plaintiffs have
won. See Jack B. Weinstein, A Survey of Changes in United States Litigation, 76 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 379, 380-84 (2002). Summary judgment in particular has become a
powerful tool for defendants. See generally Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to
Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion," "Liability Crisis" and Efficiency Clichis




B. Framing the Debate About Nullificatory Juries
We have described a vision of the rule of law that recognizes
protective, equitable, and participatory roles of nullificatory juries.
Indeed, nullificatory juries serve as a microcosm of government, acting
in executive (protective), judicial (equitable), and legislative
(participatory) ways. The benefits flowing from exercise of these roles
is substantial.
However, these benefits were not sufficient to keep jury
nullification within the legal mainstream. Courts accepted the rhetorical
critique based on the rule of law and banished jury nullification to the
hinterland of legal procedure. More alarmingly, this decision was
largely made without a full debate on the benefits of nullificatory juries,
including those derived from their protective, equitable, and
participatory roles.
Recent scholarship would have punitive damages circumscribed like
jury nullification. Indeed, arguments made by legal economists today
are strikingly similar to the formalist rule-of-law theme used in Sparf
and Hansen a century ago to limit jury nullification. The new
paternalist258 movement focuses on the jury's supposed failure to reach
correct responses to justify limitations on jury power. Like formalists,
paternalists claim the ability to measure and quantify a "correct" verdict
or response-the formalists through deductive reasoning the paternalists
through cost-benefit analysis. 9
258. Paternalism can be defined as "interference with people's liberty for their
own good." See Note, The Elephant in the Room: Evolution, Behavioralism, and
Counteradvertising in the Coming War Against Obesity, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1173
& n.79 (2003) (citing Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in PATERNALISM 19, 22 (Rolf
Sartorius ed., 1983)) (A more formal definition is that "X acts paternalistically to Y to
the extent that X, in order to secure Y's good, as an end, imposes on Y." (citing JOHN
KLEINIG, PATERNALISM 13 (1984))). Paternalism is generally criticized but has its
advocates among legal scholars. See Bailey Kuklin, Self-Paternalism in the
Marketplace, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 649, 654 & n.7 (1992) (collecting articles that support
paternalism). One alarming feature of the proposed paternalist control of juries, as
noted above, is that it is not intended to benefit the controlled party. See supra text
accompanying note 83.
259. It may seem surprising to argue that scholars like Sunstein are formalists,
because Sunstein has in other contexts criticized formalism himself. In particular,
Sunstein has argued that inflexible systems of rules create problems in application. See
generally Cass R. Sunstein, Problems With Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1995) (noting
difficulty with application of inflexible systems of rules). Based on his earlier writings,
one would presume that Sunstein would not advance formalist arguments. Sunstein's
discussion of flexibility has been cited by jury nullification advocates. See Brown, supra
note 10, at 1162 n.50, 1164 n.63, 1199 n.195. Yet, Sunstein's punitive damages
argument is quite similar to formalism in its identification of a perceived problem-that
juries do not adequately follow the rules of economics, and in its proposed solution, that
bureaucrats follow a grid in deciding what amount of damages to award private citizens
injured by other private citizens.
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But, if the experimental and empirical work is to be believed, then
the most telling characteristic of nullificatory jurors is that they are less
likely to be white men. This should raise questions about the role that
legal academics are playing in little understood relations between race
and legal power in American courtrooms.2"
If, as we described, there are three generally accepted zones in
which a nullificatory jury's actions would be proper, it is incumbent on
scholars seeking to expand restraints on nullificatory juries to answer
three questions about nullificatory verdicts in the real world:
(1)To what extent are nullificatory juries serving the protective
function?;
(2) To what extent are nullificatory jury serving equity?; and
(3) Are nullificatory juries really having a feedback "participatory"
effect?
These questions are open and deserve further study. To begin empirical
work, we now provide a more narrow definition of what constitutes a
nullificatory jury in the first instance.
In the civil context, punitive damage awards are quite rare; juries
that are exercising their power to punish excessively rather than simply
deter wrongdoing must be even more unique. As a rough test, we
propose a comparative approach. Punitive damages are said to be
excessive when they are more than a single-digit multiplier of
compensatory damages.26' Those awards exceeding the single-digit
multiplier are a good starting place to examine the rationale for
nullificatory awards. Scholars could isolate those verdicts that the
Supreme Court has said deny due process and examine the underlying
circumstances in which they arose.
In particular, we should ask several questions about these
"excessive" verdicts: (1) how did the jurors arrive at their award; (2)
what purpose did they believe it would serve; (3) was there evidence of
a failure of state action, or of a proposed utilitarian application of a legal
rule; and (4) whether there was any legislative reaction to the award.
260. Some have argued that Sunstein and other paternalist critics of juries are
guilty of a kind of "university discourse," in which the "expert or bureaucrat makes
claims to superior knowledge as a means of veiling and justifying the exercise of
power." Schroeder, supra note 78, at 272. Such labels may miss the mark. The
problem instead is a desire to propose solutions before rigorously identifying problems.




In the criminal context, identifying nullificatory verdicts might be
more difficult on a cold record. One clue might be to look for
unsuccessful drug prosecutions. Such verdicts are said to be rare-and
are perceived to be the locus of jury nullification.262 In the alternative, a
survey could be taken in a particular jurisdiction comparing blind studies
of trial judge predictions against jury outcomes. For cases in which the
judge and jury disagreed, researchers could investigate the factors that
led to any particular jury's decision.
In particular, a research program should establish whether
minorities do indeed participate as nullificatory jurors at higher rates
-than whites, and, if so, whether there were any generally shared
explanations for this trend. Researchers might also inquire whether
nullification has tended to change prosecutor or police activity in areas
where it is widespread (and thus whether nullificatory juries are serving
their protective function). Future research could also examine the
effects that procedural rules have in either supporting or undercutting
the nullificatory jury's exercise of its roles.263
The research program that we describe would enable scholars to
base their normative work on a more solid empirical foundation. If, as
we suspect, nullificatory juries are often purposefully protective rather
than arbitrary, this finding would tend to undercut the force of
arguments that jury reform was necessary to reify the rule of law. If
nullificatory juries are more than anecdotal creatures, the recent
movement to curtail punitive awards-led by legal economists and
endorsed by the Supreme Court-should be subject to renewed
questioning, and, possibly, reversed. If, on the other hand, nullificatory
juries are as lawless as their critics contend, then paternalistic solutions
would look more attractive, and supporting normative work like that of
Sunstein more prescient.
We recognize that our call for added research limits our ability to
make normative suggestions. However, we would make one normative
proposal which seems to us to be relatively innocuous, no matter what
any empirical tests show about nullificatory juries. That proposal is that
scholars and courts adopt a moratorium on calling such juries
"irrational" until further research can show the prevalence of the
legitimate functions listed above. We express this concern because, it
seems to us, such labels potentially undercut the participatory function
of the nullificatory jury.
262. See supra text accompanying note 158 (noting prevalence of jury
nullification in drug trials).
263. For example, procedural rules excluding opponents of the death penalty
from some juries might undercut the participatory and protective roles those juries play.
Similarly, jurisdictions which have instituted smaller juries might suffer a lessening of
one or more of the roles of the nullificatory jury.
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Of course, in exercising its participatory function in the punitive
damages context, the nullificatory jury may grant awards in amounts
that violate the due process clause. Such awards must be limited by
courts; nullificatory juries exercising their participatory role are
properly subject to the same constraints as legislators. In such cases,
remittitur is appropriate.
However, in granting remittitur, courts should avoid statements that
unnecessarily weaken the participatory function of the nullificatory jury
or its dialogue with the legislature through an award of damages. We
are concerned that when a court modifies an award and states in doing
so that the jury was "irrational" or "arbitrary," it signals to the
legislature that the jury's decision making ability is suspect. Courts that
convey such messages to legislatures harm the abilty of the nullificatory
jury to properly act in its participatory role.
Thus, our modest suggestion is that when a court grants remittitur,
it avoid the characterization of an award as "irrational" or "arbitrary"
and simply note that the award in the amount granted is not permitted by
due process.
VI. CONCLUSION
Nullificatory juries occupy an uneasy position within American
legal thought precisely because they are at the flashpoint between
academic theory-which all too often is normative, establishing new
clear rules-and the reality of the democratic and messy common law.
In the criminal context, nullification has gone underground.
Punitive damages could, we imagine, follow this path. This process
would prohibit punitive awards by civil juries explicitly, giving the right
to award damages to bureaucrats or judges. However, juries would
continue to award "punitive damages," sub silentio, through higher
compensatory awards. Such awards would be attacked as "lawless" and
illegitimate. Advocates might defend such verdicts as populist reactions
against corporate malfeasance. Juries in civil cases would routinely
flout black-letter law. In reaction, activists would strengthen their call
for the elimination of all juries.
This future is undesirable. Nullificatory juries, while not an
unmitigated good, do offer many unique benefits to society. Any
constraint upon them should be carefully designed to minimize the loss
of the benefits these juries provide.
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The interaction between nullificatory juries and legal elites puts to
the test our ideas about citizen involvement in the legal system.
Scholars have told us that in the name of efficiency, juries must be
replaced with administrators. However, the idea of replacing juries with
bureaucrats simply goes too far. If it is true that ordinary citizens are
unwilling to apply the legal theory of economic efficiency (or any other
legal theory), we should consider the theory-and not the citizens-to be
flawed.
* * *
